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INTRODUCTION
On any given day, about 2.2 million people are confined in
U.S. jails and prisons1—nearly 0.9% of American men are in
prison,2 and another 0.4% are in jail.3 This year, 9 or 10 million people will spend time in our prisons and jails;4 about
5000 of them will die there.5 A decade into a frustratingly
gradual decline in incarceration numbers,6 the statistics have
1
E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015, at 5 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSQ9-RE6A]; TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES IN 2015, at 3
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
58YJ-L7UY].
2
CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 5; U.S. Census Bureau, Group
Quarters Population By Sex By Age By Group Quarters Type, AMERICAN FACTFINDER,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_PCT21&prodType=table [https://
perma.cc/BGX9-FF9E].
3
MINTON & ZENG, supra note 1, at 3; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 2. I
count the 81,200 people in state prison custody who are housed in local jails in
the jail statistics above, subtracting them from the prison figures in the source to
avoid double counting.
4
Tallying this figure with any certainty is challenging. For prisons, in 2015
(last count), there were 1.5 million prisoners on any given day, of whom about
640,000 were released and another 608,000 admitted in the course of the year.
CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 5, 11. Some were both released and readmitted. So that is somewhere between 1.5 and 2 million individuals, over 2015. For
jails, about 10.9 million people were admitted in 2014. MINTON & ZENG, supra note
1, at 3. Some portion of those were admitted more than once; a 2005 estimate by
a Bureau of Justice Statistics expert put the individual admission figure at 9
million, for a year with 12.6 million total admissions to jails. See Allen Beck,
Chief, Correction Statistics Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Address at The
Jail Reentry Roundtable: The Importance of Successful Reentry to Jail Population
Growth (June 27, 2006), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/beck.ppt
[https://perma.cc/MQ7F-CCKY]. Given the lower admission rate in 2014, perhaps the corresponding figure for individuals admitted to jail is more like 7.7
million individuals.
5
MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000–2014 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2016), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mlj0014st.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5TY-2QCB]
(~1,000/year in jail); MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MORTALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 2001–2014 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msp0114st.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GK26-86D6] (~4,000/year in prison).
6
E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INMATES
IN CUSTODY OF STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, INCLUDING PRIVATE PRISON
FACILITIES, DECEMBER 31, 1999–2015 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/nps/resources
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grown familiar: We have 4.4% of the world’s population but
over 20% of its prisoners.7 Our incarceration rate is 57%
higher than Russia’s (our closest major country rival in imprisonment), nearly four times the rate in England, and over ten
times the rate in Nordic and Scandinavian countries.8 And
while American jails and prisons are less brutal and unhealthy
now than they were in the 1970s (when the total incarcerated
population was under half a million people),9 current conditions behind bars are sometimes horrendous.
As American incarcerated populations grew starting in the
1970s, so too did court oversight of prisons. That changed in
the late 1980s. Incarceration continued to boom but federal
court oversight shrank.10 A share of the responsibility goes to
Congress, which in 1996 enacted sharp limits on prisoners’
rights litigation.11 But both before and after that date, the
Supreme Court also imposed numerous doctrinal obstacles to
prisoners’ rights litigation. Many of those obstacles related to
civil rights litigation generally—to attorneys’ fees, the scope
/documents/QT_custody%20population%20including%20private%20prisons_
total.xlsx [https://perma.cc/U3ZH-H8HB]. As of 2015 (latest data), prison and
jail populations were down about 6% from their 2008 peak. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS SUPERVISED BY U.S. ADULT CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEMS, BY CORRECTIONAL STATUS, 1980–2014 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/keystatistics/excel/Correctional_population_counts_by_status_19802014.xlsx [https://perma.cc/MUX8-6DQ5].
7
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock, https://
www.census.gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_pop [https://perma.cc/994U-NF5S];
Inst. for Criminal Policy Research, Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Total,
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prisonpopulation-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=all [https://perma.cc/4W5Z-KMXR].
8
Inst. for Criminal Policy Research, supra note 7.
9
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L PRISONER STAT. BULL., PRISONERS IN STATE AND
FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ADULT FELONS: 1968–1970, at 22, tbl.10c (Apr. 1972);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENF’T ASSISTANCE ADMIN., NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS 1970, at
10, tbl.2 (1971).
10
See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger,
Civil Rights Injunctions] (discussing the trends and their causes and
consequences).
11
See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, §§ 801–10,
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523
(2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a–c, e–f, h (2012)). The PLRA was part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321. For in-depth examination of the PLRA’s impact on damage actions, see Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003)
[hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]. For in-depth examination of the PLRA’s
impact on injunctive litigation, see Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note
10. For statistics on the impact on prisoners’ lawsuits, see Margo Schlanger,
Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
153 (2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Trends].
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and sturdiness of injunctions, and similar issues.12 Others
restricted the scope of Bill of Rights protections available to
prisoners.13 This Article addresses the most central doctrinal
limit: the Supreme Court’s restrictive reading of the constitutional provisions governing treatment of prisoners—the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Due Process
Clause, which regulate, respectively, post-conviction imprisonment and pretrial detention. The Court’s interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment’s ban of cruel and unusual punishment, in
particular, has radically undermined prison officials’ accountability for tragedies behind bars—allowing, even encouraging,
them to avoid constitutional accountability. And lower courts
compounded the error by importing that reading into Due Process doctrine as well.
We must do better. As Justice Kennedy recently wrote:
Prisoners are shut away—out of sight, out of mind. It seems
fair to suggest that, in decades past, the public may have
assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a careful assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and
judges assumed these matters were for the policymakers and
correctional experts.14

An opportunity exists, right now, to reconfigure the constitutional law of incarceration to facilitate additional judicial oversight, and to be simultaneously more logical, consistent, and
just. That possibility was opened up by the Supreme Court’s
2015 opinion in Kingsley v. Hendrickson,15 a jail case addressing the liability standard for official uses of force against pretrial detainees. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected jail
officials’ proposed standards—that officers’ use of force be
deemed to violate detainees’ constitutional rights only when the
officer imposed force “maliciously and sadistically for the very
12
See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (limiting availability of fee shifting; no fees may
be awarded based on defendants’ voluntary cessation of challenged conduct, even
if induced by a lawsuit); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992)
(insisting on a flexible standard for alteration of structural reform consent
decrees).
13
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–88 (1987) (holding that constitutional rights in prison may be abridged if the challenged policy is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 347–50 (1987) (allowing constraints on religious exercise in prison, even
when alternative accommodations might be available); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 522–28 (1984) (holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cells).
14
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
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purpose of causing harm”16 or was criminally reckless. Instead, relying on 1970s precedent, not subsequent case law
that had placed undue emphasis on the subjective culpability
of prison and jail officials as the crucial source of constitutional
concern, the Kingsley Court returned to a more appropriate
objective analysis.
In finding for the plaintiff in Kingsley, the Supreme Court
unsettled the law far past the case’s direct factual setting of
pretrial detention, expressly inviting post-conviction challenges
to restrictive—and incoherent—Eighth Amendment case law.
Over the vehement opposition of Justice Scalia, the Court rejected not only the defendants’ position but the logic that underlies twenty-five years of pro-government outcomes in
prisoners’ rights cases. But commentary and developing case
law since Kingsley has not fully recognized its implications.
Even courts and commentators who have understood that
Kingsley’s logic reaches past use-of-force to conditions-of-confinement cases have not appreciated that it suggests not
merely a softening of the liability standard from criminal recklessness to civil recklessness, but a more sweeping change.17
And so far, no court or sustained commentary has analyzed the
logical and normative considerations that suggest that the
same analysis applies to post-conviction prisoners as well. In
this Article, I argue that constitutional doctrine should follow
Kingsley’s lead and center on the objective experience of incarcerated prisoners, rather than the culpability of their keepers.
The bottom line of my analysis is that the Constitution imposes
governmental liability for harm caused to prisoners—whether
pretrial or post-conviction—by unreasonably dangerous conditions of confinement and unjustified uses of force.
Part I begins with a doctrinal history; prisoners’ rights
precedents are unfamiliar to many, and I summarize the preKingsley Supreme Court case law as it evolved over time. Even
for those conversant with recent prisoners’ rights cases, the
1980s/90s doctrinal shift I describe may come as a surprise.
Then I examine the key logical fault line in the doctrine—its
reliance on an undersupported and idiosyncratic definition of
the concept of “punishment” as the foundation for a subjective
liability standard under the Eighth Amendment. Part II examines several jail use-of-force scenarios, using them as test
cases facilitating normative evaluation of various liability rules.
16
Brief for Respondents at 15, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015) (No. 14-6368), 2015 WL 1519055, at *15.
17
See infra Part III.
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Part III addresses Kingsley itself, exploring the two principal
opinions in depth. I suggest that Kingsley’s reading of its chief
precedent, Bell v. Wolfish, is a fair one, and I explain how that
reading directs adjudicatory attention to objective evaluation of
the reasonableness of uses of force, rather than conditioning
liability for excessive force on either the punitive intent or recklessness of the jail officer. I then move from use of force to
conditions of confinement, arguing that Kingsley doctrinally
entails a similar objective liability rule in that context as well,
and I defend that outcome normatively. In Part IV, I look at the
ways organizational dynamics support the Kingsley rule and
argue that Kingsley’s salutary return to a non-culpabilitybased liability regime avoids a deeply problematic entailment of
a culpability-based system, a “cost defense” to constitutional
liability. In Part V, I shift from pretrial detainees and the Fourteenth Amendment to convicted prisoners and the Eighth
Amendment; the reasonableness approach is compelling there,
too.
The Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the 1980s and
1990s, adopting an unjustified and unproductive Eighth
Amendment doctrine that made jailers’ hearts the touchstone
for prisoners’ rights litigation, rather than the objective impact
of their choices. In Kingsley, the Court appropriately declined
to compound the error in a pretrial detainee case. Often ruling
on cases brought by pro se prisoners, not all lower courts have
yet understood the full scope of what Kingsley requires. That
must change. In addition, prisoners’ rights lawyers should begin pressing to realize Kingsley’s full potential, bringing to the
Supreme Court a case that allows the Court to rectify its Eighth
Amendment wrong turn and resume a better path. In this era
of mass incarceration, our jails and prisons should not be
shielded from accountability by legal standards that lack both
doctrinal and normative warrant.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF JAIL AND PRISON
CONDITIONS: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
Current case law holds that three different clauses of the
Constitution protect people detained in American jails or prisons from excessively harsh or dangerous treatment or conditions.18 Beginning at some as-yet-undertheorized point in the
18
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (“In addressing an excessive
force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force. In
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arrest/detention process19 up until criminal conviction, the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses afford
detainees protection against excessive force and harmful conditions of confinement.20 Analogous protections for convicted
prisoners are governed by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.21 (In addition, though not discussed in this Article, the Fourth Amendment bans unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes excessive force or
other abusive treatment of arrestees.22) Case law further divides claims into two general categories: use of force and conditions of confinement. The latter includes, for example, claims
relating to medical and mental health care; failure to protect a
prisoner from other prisoners; problems relating to nutrition,
vermin, ventilation; and so on.
Table 1 summarizes the current Supreme Court case law
in a two-by-two grid; the four cells include four different liability standards.

most instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional
protection against physically abusive governmental conduct. The validity of the
claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right, rather than to some generalized ‘excessive force’ standard.” (internal citation omitted)).
19
See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2479 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Erica
Haber, Note, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit Court Split
on When Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force
Cases, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 939 (2003).
20
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2477.
21
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1986).
22
See Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1009 (2013) (arguing that, prior to a judicial determination of probable
cause, detainees’ conditions and force claims should be analyzed under a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test; and after such a determination, under a Fourteenth Amendment objective deliberate indifference test). The Fourth Amendment
also governs searches in jails and prisons. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516–17 (2012); Bell, 441 U.S. at 558–59.
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TABLE 1: PRISONERS’ RIGHTS LIABILITY STANDARDS
Pretrial detention
(Due Process Clauses)

Use of Force

Conditions of
confinement

Post-conviction
imprisonment
(Cruel & Unusual
Punishment Clause)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson Whitley v. Albers (1986)/
(2015)
Hudson v. McMillian (1992)
“force purposely or knowing- “maliciously and sadistically
ly used . . . was objectively for the very purpose of
unreasonable”23
causing harm”24
Bell v. Wolfish (1979)
Wilson v. Seiter (1991)/
“an expressed intent to pun- Farmer v. Brennan (1994)
ish on the part of detention Liability depends on both an
facility officials,” or “whether “objective component . . .
an alternative purpose to (Was the deprivation suffiwhich [the restriction] may ciently serious?), and . . . [a]
rationally be connected is subjective component (Did
assignable for it, and wheth- the officials act with a suffier it appears excessive in ciently culpable state of
relation to the alternative mind?).”26 The subjective
purpose assigned [to it].”25
component—“deliberate indifference”—means “conscious[ ] disregar[d]” [of] a
substantial risk of serious
harm.”27

The table suggests more clarity to the divisions between its
four cells than lower court case law reflects. Between 1979
(Bell) and 2015 (Kingsley), the Supreme Court offered little guidance on the difference between pretrial and post-conviction
standards, instead offering only the comment that “due process
rights . . . are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.”28 In response,
23

Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6.
25
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (alterations in the original).
26
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
27
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994).
28
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). For a typical
Court of Appeals treatment, see, for example, Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d
392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although the Eighth Amendment only applies to convicted prisoners, this court has previously stated that the same standard applies
to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.”).
See Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, but as a pretrial detainee, [Plaintiff] was
entitled to at least the same protection against deliberate indifference to his basic
needs as is available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.”); see
also Jackson v. Ill. Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen
considering a pretrial detainee’s claim of inadequate medical care, we frequently
turn to the analogous standards of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
24
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the lower federal courts blurred the standards. The distinction
between use of force and conditions is contestable as well. For
example, which category describes use of restraints—handcuffs, shackles, restraint chairs, etc.? Restraints are considered a use of force in jail and prison policies29 but have been
analyzed as conditions in the Supreme Court.30
I move now to the relevant doctrinal development.
A. Stage 1: Before the 1970s
Most conditions-of-confinement litigation has involved
convicted prisoners31 and, therefore, the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Constitutional challenges to conditions of confinement were unusual until the
1960s. The delay was not because the Supreme Court struggled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment covered prison
conditions; the few relevant cases made clear the Court’s understanding that the Constitution forbids inhumane penal conditions. In fact, this was the taken-for-granted part of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, as other more contested issues
were litigated. For example, in the 1910 case Weems v. United
States,32 when the Court held unconstitutional a punishment
handed down in the Philippines of fifteen years’ imprisonment
and “cadena temporal,” the Court emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment was very much concerned with the mode and conditions of punishment. It explained that the punishment
under review was more than a long period of imprisonment.
The defendant, the Court explained, was sentenced to “bear a
chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as
hard labor.”33 In the end, the Court concluded that both the
term and the type of punishment were problematic: The sentence “is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which
accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of
the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind.”34
Weems’s discussion of cadena temporal and painful and
hard labor as illegal thus expressly acknowledges that the
29

E.g., AM. CORR. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DEFACILITIES 32–33, 4-ALDF-2B-01 to -03 (4th ed. 2004).
30
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736–38 (2002).
31
Cf. Anne Morrison Piehl & Margo Schlanger, Determinants of Civil Rights
Filings in Federal District Court by Jail and Prison Inmates, 1 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD.
79 (2004).
32
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
33
Id. at 366.
34
Id. at 377.
TENTION
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treatment of prisoners is regulated by the Eighth Amendment.
This was not even the controversial part of Weems: It was the
Court’s holding with respect to the length rather than the mode
of punishment that provoked the dissent, by Justice Edward
White, and that overrode the prosecution brief.35 The Court’s
cadena temporal holding was contested on the merits—the dissent argued that the conditions were not all that bad.36 But
unlike the proportionality holding, this part of the majority’s
approach did not elicit the objection that conditions were categorically beyond the reach of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.37
Early death penalty jurisprudence similarly suggested that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is concerned with
the method of punishment. For example, when in 1890 the
Supreme Court upheld the use of the electric chair as a method
of execution in In re Kemmler, the Court commented that the
method (rather than the fact of execution) was precisely the
subject of the Eighth Amendment challenge38: “Punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
35
See id. at 411 (White, J., dissenting). The United States defended the
prisoner’s sentence by explaining, “There is nothing cruel or unusual in a long
term of imprisonment, as the words are used in the Bill of Rights. The description
there refers rather to mutilations and degradations, and not to length or duration
of the punishment.” Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 12, Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910) (No. 193). Rather than covering the length of the sentence,
the United States argued, “cruel and unusual punishment” indicated the nature
of the punishment: “such punishment as would amount to torture, or which is so
cruel as to shock the conscience and reason of men; that something inhuman and
barbarous is implied.” Id. at 13; see also Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 55 (1910) (“All courts would agree in holding some
punishments forbidden, as, to chain a prisoner by the neck for several hours so
that he must remain standing, a modern imitation of the pillory.”) (citing In re
Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889)).
36
See Weems, 217 U.S. at 412 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the conditions as merely “irksome”).
37
The Philippine Supreme Court, looking to limit the impact of Weems, read
it to outlaw cadena temporal only when imposed as a punishment for the precise
crime adjudicated in that case. See Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in American
Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L.
REV. 251, 294 (2006) (citing United States v. Pico, 18 PHIL. REP. 386, 389–90 (S.C.,
Feb. 11, 1911)) (“Confronted as we are with the knowledge that consequences so
far-reaching and disastrous must result from a holding favorable to the contention of counsel on this motion, it is manifestly our duty rigidly to restrict the
application of the doctrine laid down in the Weems case to cases wherein the ratio
decidendi in that case is clearly applicable and to decline to be bound by inferences drawn from observations and comments contained in the opinion in that
case which appear to be based upon a misapprehension of facts, or upon assumed facts which do not accord with the facts in the cases brought before us.”).
38
See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). Notably, the Court did not
devote even a word to the issue of whether the method was chosen by the legislature, a judge or jury, or the executive.
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punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”39 In a later electric chair case, Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, a Supreme Court plurality explained
that “the Constitution protects a convicted man” from the “cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,”40 or any other
“execution by a state in a cruel manner.”41 In this case, the
petitioner had already been subjected to a failed attempt at
electrocution; he challenged the state’s second try. The Court
agreed that the Constitution forbids “the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence” as part of an
Eighth Amendment “prohibition against the wanton infliction
of pain.”42 Expressly under the “assum[ption] that the state
officials carried out their duties under the death warrant in a
careful and humane manner,” the Court explained that the
petitioner failed because he had presented neither a “purpose
to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved
in the proposed execution.”43 Thus, as Sharon Dolovich has
summarized the cases: “For more than a century, the Court
has confronted Eighth Amendment challenges to the methods
by which state officials have administered death sentences and
in each case has assumed without question that the challenged
methods, as punishment, are appropriately subject to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.”44
Moreover, while lower courts in the 1940s and 1950s frequently declined to regulate prison conditions,45 there are
some important, if scattered, cases in which lower courts did
indeed declare conditions of confinement unconstitutional,
when they (as they rarely did) had jurisdiction to decide the
issue. For example, in 1889, District Judge Emory Speer held
that a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights had been
violated by a county jailer who chained him by the neck to a
grating in his cell at night “so that he could not put his heels to
the ground.”46 And in a famous series of habeas corpus cases
in the 1940s, federal courts held that the Eighth Amendment
39

Id.
329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947).
41
Id. at 463.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 462, 464.
44
Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 898 (2009).
45
For a sampling of cases, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599, 602 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
40
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was violated by brutal conditions of confinement escaped state
prisoner-petitioners faced if they were extradited to complete
their sentences.47 (These extradition attacks ended when the
Supreme Court intimated that their petitioners must first bring
their claims in the courts of the states from which they had
fled. But the Court did not address the merits.48)
If the Eighth Amendment encompassed prison conditions,
why were prisoners’ conditions-of-confinement lawsuits so
scarce? Numerous barriers existed until toppled, one by one,
by the Supreme Court. First, in 1941, the Court barred official
censorship practices that prevented prisoners’ petitions from
even arriving at federal courthouses.49 Then the Supreme
Court in 1961 revived 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thereby gave prisoner plaintiffs a jurisdictional path into federal court.50 In
1962, the Court deemed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause applicable against states and localities.51 And in 1964,
it held that there was no categorical bar to prisoner constitutional lawsuits.52 The federal disinclination to meddle in
prison operations—labeled, after the fact, the “hands-off doctrine”53—was dead.
So it was not until the 1960s, with the path thus cleared,
that lower courts began to frequently scrutinize conditions of
confinement in state prison and local jails, and occasionally to
find them unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As I have previously described, the first such
cases involved prison discipline—corporal punishment54 and
conditions in disciplinary isolation55—perhaps because these
were easiest to conceptualize as “punishment” additional to the
47

See, e.g., Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 255–56 (1949).
The Court stated only, “The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the
judgment is reversed. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114.” Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S.
864 (1949). The citation to Ex parte Hawk, an exhaustion case, had the import
explained in text.
49
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 485–86 (1969).
50
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
51
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
53
The “hands-off” phrase originated in a document prepared in 1961 for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, but was put in circulation by a 1963 law student
journal note. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 (1963) (citing M. FRITCH,
CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961)). It was first used by the Supreme Court in 1974, after the hands-off era had closed. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974).
54
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
55
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
48
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sentence of incarceration.56 But further evolution was very
speedy: by 1970, plaintiffs had won the first federal case to
order wholesale reform of a prison, in Arkansas.57 With few
other effective avenues for complaint, prisoners started to bring
federal cases in large numbers,58 alleging various types of inhumane treatment—brutal disciplinary sanctions for prison
misconduct,59 excessive force, failures to provide adequate
medical care, failures to protect from violence and extortion by
other prisoners,60 and the like.61
B. Stage 2: Estelle Through Rhodes, 1976–1981
The first case in which the Court articulated a liability
standard was Estelle v. Gamble,62 a prisoner’s lawsuit seeking
damages for allegedly poor medical care in a Texas prison.
Estelle was quite a low-profile case—no amicus briefs were
filed, and the New York Times described the majority opinion as
“generally stat[ing] the law as it has been developing in the
lower Federal courts.”63 In the 1976 opinion by Justice Marshall, joined by six colleagues, the Court began with the observation that while the Eighth Amendment had long been seen to
“proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment,”64 “[o]ur more recent cases” reach more broadly: “The
Amendment embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . . .’”65 The Court
stated, quoting then-Judge Blackmun’s Eighth Circuit opinion
forbidding the prison punishment of whipping: “Thus, we have
held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which
are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that
56
See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2003–04 (1999) and cases cited.
57
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, PC-AR-0004 (E.D. Ark.), CIV. RIGHTS LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=553 [https://perma.cc/
9KK6-3SY8].
58
The federal court system began keeping track in 1970; for data, see
Schlanger, Trends, supra note 11, at 157.
59
Jackson, 404 F.2d at 574–76.
60
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687–88 (1978).
61
For an early “how to” guide for prisoner plaintiffs’ counsel, see William
Bennett Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners’
Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971).
62
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
63
Lesley Oelsner, Prison Medical Care Assayed by Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1976, at D24, http://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/01/archives/prison-medi
cal-care-assayed-by-justices-deliberate-indifference-is.html [https://perma.cc/
U7W8-E9AA].
64
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (internal alterations in original).
65
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).

R
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mark the progress of a maturing society,’ . . . or which ‘involve
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”66
On the basis of “[t]hese elementary principles,” the Court
had no difficulty concluding that the government has an
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do
so, those needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a
failure may actually produce physical “torture or a lingering
death,” the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of
the Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care
may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests
would serve any penological purpose. The infliction of such
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency . . . .67

Indeed, none of this was even contested. The briefs show
that both parties in Estelle agreed that the Eighth Amendment
required provision of medical care in prison. What the briefs
disagreed about was the precise liability standard.68 On that
issue, Justice Marshall wrote for the majority that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”69 The Court’s
reasoning featured precedent rather than first principles or
textual or historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment. Just
as a second electrocution attempt in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber was not unconstitutional, the Estelle Court held,
Similarly, in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute
“an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” . . . Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend
66

Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 103 (internal citations omitted).
68
Compare Brief for Respondent, Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (No. 75-929),
1976 WL 181424, at *20 (“If the treatment or lack of treatment of a prisoner is
such that it amounts to indifference or intentional mistreatment, it violates the
prisoner’s constitutional guarantees.”), with Brief for Petitioners, Estelle, 429 U.S.
97 (1976) (No. 75-929), 1976 WL 181423, at *10 (“[A] complaint alleging a failure
or refusal to provide medical care states a claim upon which relief can be granted
and should not be dismissed. To the contrary, a complaint alleging inadequate
medical treatment should be dismissed unless exceptional circumstances exist
which warrant judicial inquiry.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
69
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
67
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“evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.70

But, like the plaintiff’s brief that had offered the expression as
the touchstone for liability,71 Justice Marshall did not elaborate further on the meaning of “deliberate indifference,” a
phrase that had entered Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
only a few years earlier, in a Second Circuit case.72
Justice Blackmun declined to join this analysis; he concurred in the outcome only, without opinion.73 Justice Stevens
dissented from the left, stating the position to which he would
hold for the next two decades,74 that the standard for liability
should be objective. Although he described the Court’s opinion
as “[m]ost[ly] . . . consistent with the way the lower federal
courts have been processing claims that the medical treatment
of prison inmates is so inadequate as to constitute the cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment,” Justice Stevens criticized other passages in the majority
opinion because they “describe[ ] the State’s duty to provide
adequate medical care to prisoners in ambiguous terms which
incorrectly relate to the subjective motivation of persons accused of violating the Eighth Amendment rather than to the
standard of care required by the Constitution”75:
Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any, remedy is appropriate against a particular defendant. However,
whether the constitutional standard has been violated
should turn on the character of the punishment rather than
the motivation of the individual who inflicted it. Whether the
70

Id. at 105–06.
Brief for Respondent, Estelle, supra note 68, at *13.
72
See Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970).
73
Examination of the Blackmun papers sheds little light on why Blackmun
declined to join; his explanatory letter to Justice Marshall lists a number of
concerns, but none seem terribly important. See Memorandum from Justice
Harry Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 22, 1976) (on file with the
Harry A. Blackmun papers, Library of Congress) (concerning Estelle v. Gamble,
No. 75-929).
74
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 108–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 579–99 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 12–13 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 858 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“While I continue to believe that a state official may inflict cruel and
unusual punishment without any improper subjective motivation . . . .”), with
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (making
the same point with respect to Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment: “‘Deprivation,’ it seems to me, identifies, not the actor’s state of
mind, but the victim’s infringement or loss.”).
75
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 108–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71

R
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conditions in Andersonville were the product of design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and inhuman.76

Justice Stevens did not disagree with the Court that mere
negligence is not unconstitutional. He explained:
Of course, not every instance of improper health care violates
the Eighth Amendment. Like the rest of us, prisoners must
take the risk that a competent, diligent physician will make
an error. Such an error may give rise to a tort claim but not
necessarily to a constitutional claim. But when the State
adds to this risk, as by providing a physician who does not
meet minimum standards of competence or diligence or who
cannot give adequate care because of an excessive caseload
or inadequate facilities, then the prisoner may suffer from a
breach of the State’s constitutional duty.77

Stevens’s Estelle dissent linked the objective standard to
his view that constitutional obligations to prisoners amount to
affirmative rather than negative duties:
If a State elects to impose imprisonment as a punishment for
crime, I believe it has an obligation to provide the persons in
its custody with a health care system which meets minimal
standards of adequacy. As a part of that basic obligation, the
State and its agents have an affirmative duty to provide reasonable access to medical care, to provide competent, diligent
medical personnel, and to ensure that prescribed care is in
fact delivered. For denial of medical care is surely not part of
the punishment which civilized nations may impose for
crime.78

The dissent was prescient; it took ten years, but eventually
Justice Stevens’s feared close examination of particular officials’ intentions, rather than of the felt experience of incarceration, did indeed materialize in Supreme Court case law.79
During the intervening decade, however, the Court took a
quite different approach. Just two years after Estelle, in the
1978 case of Hutto v. Finney, Justice Stevens himself wrote for
the majority, describing conditions of confinement in Arkansas
as “constitut[ing] cruel and unusual punishment” by emphasizing the objectively horrendous conditions.80 The Hutto district court’s conclusion that the imprisonment in Arkansas was
“a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world” was,
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 116 n.13.
Id.
See infra Part III.
437 U.S. 678, 685–87 (1978).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN203.txt

unknown

Seq: 17

19-JAN-18

2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INCARCERATION

13:41

373

Justice Stevens wrote, “amply supported by the evidence.”81
There was no discussion of deliberate indifference or any other
kind of scienter or subjective motivation. Perhaps this was
because the case was injunctive and forward-looking—so at
least once they received the complaint, the defendants were on
notice of the conditions. But the opinion does not suggest, or
even so much as hint, that the remedial posture is the reason
for its objective perspective.
The very next term, in another injunctive case, Bell v. Wolfish, the Court flirted with, but in the end did not quite adopt, a
scienter requirement in a jail conditions-of-confinement case
brought under the Due Process Clause. Bell, in 1979, was the
Court’s first pretrial detention conditions-of-confinement opinion. In it, the Court reviewed a Second Circuit opinion by
Judge Irving Kaufman which held that, in light of the presumption of innocence, “pretrial detainees may be subjected to only
those ‘restrictions and privations’ which ‘inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by compelling necessities
of jail administration.’”82 In an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected this approach as too pro-prisoner.
The presumption of innocence, the Court emphasized, “is a
doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials”
but “it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even
begun.”83 The protection afforded pretrial detainees was more
limited, the majority wrote: “[W]e think that the proper inquiry
is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. . . . Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense,
however.”84
The Court explained:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of
some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn
on “whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned [to it].” Thus, if a particular condition or restriction
of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
81
82
83
84

Id. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
Id. at 535, 537.
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[nonpunitive] governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to “punishment.”85

Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the balancing test
should be less deferentially performed and without the gloss
that its purpose was to discern if a particular restraint should
be deemed “punishment.”86 He emphasized, as well, that the
appropriate constitutional inquiry should be entirely objective:
“By its terms, the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of
deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them. If this concern is to be vindicated, it is the effect of conditions of confinement, not the intent behind them, that must be the focal point
of constitutional analysis.”87
Justice Stevens also dissented. Joined by Justice Brennan, Stevens took the same approach as he had in Estelle.
Stevens agreed with the Court that the key to the constitutional
inquiry was whether a plaintiff’s “treatment amounts to punishment.”88 But like Marshall, he thought the Court’s methodology far too deferential.89 In addition, and most important for
the analysis in this article, Stevens explained that he feared an
aggressive reading of the Court’s “intent” language. He noted
that “the Court does not expressly disavow the objective criteria
identified in Mendoza-Martinez” but nonetheless criticized the
Court for simultaneously adverting to the subjective state of
mind of jail officials. This subjective inquiry, he wrote, “can
only ‘encourage hypocrisy and unconscious self-deception.’”90
And doctrinally, “[w]hile a subjective intent may provide a sufficient reason for finding that punishment has been inflicted,
such an intent is clearly not a necessary nor even the most
common element of a punitive sanction.”91
Thus in Justice Stevens’s view, conditions evaluated for
constitutionality under the Due Process Clause could fail that
evaluation for two independently sufficient reasons: Conditions
may have been intended as punishment, or they may have
functioned as punishment. The latter analysis “is not always
85
Id. at 538–39 (citations omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
86
See id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 567.
88
Id. at 583–84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89
See id. at 585 (“In my view, the Court has reached an untenable conclusion
because its test for punishment is unduly permissive.”).
90
Id. at 585 (quoting HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
33 (1968)).
91
Id. at 585–86.
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easy,” Justice Stevens conceded, but it was nonetheless required.92 He offered three factors:
When sanctions involve “affirmative disabilit[ies]” and when
they have “historically been regarded as a punishment,” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S., at 168–169, courts
must be sensitive to the possibility that those sanctions are
punitive. So, too, when the rules governing detention fail to
draw any distinction among those who are detained—suggesting that all may be subject to rules designed for the most
dangerous few—careful scrutiny must be applied. Finally,
and perhaps most important, when there is a significant and
unnecessary disparity between the severity of the harm to the
individual and the demonstrated importance of the regulatory objective, see ibid., courts must be justified in drawing
an inference of punishment.93

There was, actually, less distance between the Bell majority
and Justice Stevens’s dissent than that dissent acknowledges.
To be sure, it is possible to read the Court’s specified method
for identifying “punishment” as resting, ultimately, on the jailers’ scienter. The first way for a jail to fail the constitutional
test was for plaintiffs to demonstrate officials’ intent to punish.
Perhaps the second way—“[a]bsent a showing of an expressed
intent to punish”94—conceptually also depended on punitive
intent, allowing plaintiffs to show the arbitrariness of the challenged jail condition as circumstantial evidence of such intent.
Indeed, the Court implied this in one part of the opinion: “[I]f a
restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees
qua detainees.”95 At another point, however, the opinion described the standard as mandatory, not permissive: “[T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices constitute
punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether they appear excessive in relation
to that purpose.”96
92
Id. at 584 (“Having recognized the constitutional right to be free of punishment, the Court may not point to the difficulty of the task as a justification for
confining the scope of the punishment concept so narrowly that it effectively
abdicates to correction officials the judicial responsibility to enforce the guarantees of due process.”).
93
Id. at 588.
94
Id. at 538.
95
Id. at 539.
96
Id. at 561 (emphasis added).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN203.txt

376

unknown

Seq: 20

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

19-JAN-18

13:41

[Vol. 103:357

Moreover, as Justice Stevens acknowledged, the Court expressly invoked the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors for
evaluating what is punishment, quoting:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant
to the inquiry . . . .97

In Mendoza-Martinez itself, these factors were evaluated objectively, independent of “congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute.”98 The Bell Court, consistent with that
approach, labeled them “useful guideposts in determining
whether particular restrictions and conditions accompanying
pretrial detention amount to punishment in the constitutional
sense of that word.”99 “Amount to” indicates that the objective
indicia are themselves the object of inquiry, not mere evidence
of subjective intent to punish.
Finally, when the Court actually proceeded from doctrinal
exposition to application, it examined not the minds of the
defendants but whether the double celling in the jail that plaintiffs complained about caused sufficient “genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time [to] raise serious
questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those
conditions amounted to punishment.”100 Without even a word
devoted to jail officials’ subjective beliefs about double celling,
the Court evaluated the objective circumstances—for example,
the size of the cells and the hours spent in-cell—and concluded
that “nothing even approaching such hardship is shown by this
record.”101 Some such restrictions, the Court said, are, on
evaluation, “an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.”102 But others, whose harshness exceeds
their nonpunitive justification, will not pass muster. The actual inquiry the Bell Court modeled did not turn on the intent
97
Id. at 587 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).
98
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
99
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
100
Id. at 542.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 539 n.20.
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of a particular jail official or of the jail administration as a
whole; it turned on the impact on the inmate and the justification offered for that impact. Bell reversed the Court of Appeals
because the objective degree of hardship the plaintiffs demonstrated was insufficient to make out a case. So Justice Stevens
is correct that the Bell majority opinion includes some subjective language—but in the final analysis, Bell is best read to
announce, and itself utilizes, an objective approach and
standard.
The next case was back in the Eighth Amendment column;
as in Hutto, the Court devoted no words to scienter in the 1981
Rhodes v. Chapman.103 There the Court upheld double celling
in a maximum-security Ohio prison, rejecting a request for a
prospective injunction. The majority opinion, by Justice
Powell—writing for the five Justices on the Court’s right wing—
evaluated the overcrowded conditions entirely objectively, from
the perspective of the inmates’ actual experience:
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison population did not lead to deprivations of
essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase
violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Although job and educational
opportunities diminished marginally as a result of double
celling, limited work hours and delay before receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton
pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments.104

Two concurrences in the judgment by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, and a dissent by Justice Marshall, urged a more
aggressive flavor of court review of prison conditions.
In sum, in its 1976 Estelle opinion, the Court stated that
the constitutionality of conditions of confinement turned on the
“deliberate indifference” of the officials who created those conditions—but in no Supreme Court case over the subsequent
decade did this verbiage ripen into any real examination of any
real person’s state of mind.105
C. Stage 3: Whitley Through Farmer, 1986–1994
Things changed in 1986, in Whitley v. Albers, a damage
action in which the Court denied liability to a non-rioting prisoner shot in the leg as authorities responded to a prison riot.
103
104
105

452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Id. at 348 (citation omitted).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
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The resignation of Justice Stewart and Chief Justice Burger
and appointments of Justices O’Connor and Scalia had shifted
the Court considerably to the right. In a (bare) majority opinion
by Justice O’Connor, the Court quoted Estelle’s reference to
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” as the essence of
“cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment,”106 and explained:
Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a
disturbance, such as occurred in this case, that indisputably
poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately
turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.”107

Whitley thus required prisoner-plaintiffs complaining of
excessive force in a riot situation to demonstrate official-defendants’ intent to harm in order to make out a constitutional
case. While Justice O’Connor primarily justified that requirement by policy considerations relating to the difficulty and urgent need to quell prison riots, her opinion also gestured
towards a textual hook, which would emerge in Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence several years later as the conceptual center of
Eighth Amendment doctrine. She wrote that a high bar to liability was appropriate because force in prison was “conduct
that does not purport to be punishment at all.”108 (Although
her opinion several times cited the school corporal punishment
case, Ingraham v. Wright, she did not address its statement—
admittedly dicta—that “[p]rison brutality . . . is ‘part of the total
punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his
crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.’”109)
Justice Marshall (joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens) dissented: the correct standard, he argued, was the already-high “unnecessary and wanton” standard from
Estelle.110 The Court’s “maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm” standard was inappropriate,
106

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at

103).
107
Id. at 319, 320–21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.)).
108
Id. at 319.
109
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (citation omitted).
110
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104).
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and without support in the precedents cited in its favor.111
Justice O’Connor had cited a famous excessive force opinion by
Judge Friendly as the source for the “malicious and sadistic”
standard, but, Marshall pointed out, “That opinion . . . considered maliciousness not as a prerequisite to a constitutional
violation, but rather as a factor that, if present, could enable a
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss when otherwise the facts
might be insufficient to make out a claim.”112 (Interestingly,
Justice Stevens, who critiqued the deliberate indifference test
in its original appearance in Estelle, evidently saw prison useof-force issues as different; he signed Justice Marshall’s concurrence without cavil on this issue.113)
The next case in the series was Wilson v. Seiter,114 decided
in 1991. The plaintiff state prisoner alleged “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate
heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.”115
The issue before the Court was whether Eighth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement cases would be governed by the
subjective standard Whitley applied to prison use of force and
Estelle applied in medical care cases, or by the objective standard manifested in the two most recent conditions-of-confinement cases, Rhodes v. Chapman (under the Eighth
Amendment) and Bell v. Wolfish (under the Due Process
Clause). In his opinion for the (again bare) majority, Justice
Scalia not only chose the former but went much farther, denying that the precedents were in conflict. Justice Scalia argued
that rather than wavering between a subjective and objective
approach to the Eighth Amendment, the Court had, without
explaining itself, adopted both subjective and objective tests as
independent hurdles to constitutional liability. That is, Justice
Scalia explained the absence of a subjective test in Hutto and
Rhodes as indicating not that scienter didn’t matter, but simply
that it was not at issue: those cases had, sub silentio, been
applying the objective half of a two-part standard.116
111
112

Id. at 320–21 (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033).
Id. at 329 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing Glick, 481 F.2d at

1033).
113
Justice Stevens did disclaim one footnote in the dissent, but it dealt with a
different issue. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 334 n.2. The Blackmun and Marshall
papers shed no additional light on his thinking on this point.
114
498 U.S. 808 (1990) (granting the petition for a writ of certiorari); 501 U.S.
294 (1991).
115
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.
116
Id. at 296–99, 301 n.2.
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In Estelle and Whitley, the majority opinions had merely
gestured towards constitutional text or theory in offering their
subjective tests. Estelle offered the “deliberate indifference”
standard as a gloss on the entire Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Whitley supported its malicious-and-sadistic
standard by noting that prison official force “does not purport
to be punishment at all.”117 In Wilson, Justice Scalia offered a
more extensive doctrinal argument:
The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections
of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans
only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to
the inflicting officer before it can qualify.118

He justified the point as implementing the plain meaning of the
word, quoting Judge Posner:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to
chastise or deter. This is what the word means today; it is
what it meant in the eighteenth century . . . . [I]f [a] guard
accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this
would not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the usage of
1791, or 1868, or 1985.119

Given this justification—that punishment means “intended to chastise or deter”—one reads Justice Scalia’s opinion
expecting that in the next paragraphs it will choose the extant
intent-focused standard, and attach Whitley v. Albers’s “malicious and sadistic” language to conditions-of-confinement
cases. Here, however, Justice Scalia backed off. Whether reflecting his own judgment or because he could go no farther
given others’ views,120 he wrote: “Having determined that
Eighth Amendment claims based on official conduct that does
not purport to be the penalty formally imposed for a crime
require inquiry into state of mind, it remains for us to consider
what state of mind applies in cases challenging prison condi117

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
119
Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J.)).
120
Justice Blackmun’s conference notes show that in the discussion of the
case, the Court’s conservatives, including the Chief Justice at the very start of
discussion, endorsed a deliberate indifference standard. Justice Blackmun writes
of Justice Scalia’s position, “Reverse and remand. With SOC and use delib indiff.”
(Some additional description is illegible.) Conference Notes (Jan. 9, 1991) (on file
with the Harry A. Blackmun papers, Library of Congress, Box 65) (concerning
Wilson v. Seiter, No. 89-7376).
118
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tions.”121 His answer? Estelle had already stated the rule: deliberate indifference is the mental state forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.122 Estelle’s approach could not be limited to
medical care alone, Justice Scalia explained, but rather covers
all conditions of confinement: “Indeed, the medical care a prisoner receives is just as much a ‘condition’ of his confinement as
the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the temperature he
is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded
against other inmates.”123 The Court remanded for application
of the correct standard to the facts in the case.124
There is no indication whatsoever in the Hutto or Rhodes
opinions or briefs that Justice Scalia’s reading of them in
Whitley is correct—that is, that the objective approach they
took constituted just one half of a two-part test. A concurrence
in the Whitley judgment by Justice White (joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) emphasized the point. As a
matter of precedent and policy, Justice White suggested, the
Court’s approach was wrongheaded:
Rhodes makes it crystal clear . . . that Eighth Amendment
challenges to conditions of confinement are to be treated like
Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment that is ‘formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge,’—we examine only the objective severity, not
the subjective intent of government officials.125

The White concurrence reads very like Justice Stevens’s
Estelle dissent. But White had signed onto Marshall’s majority
opinion in Estelle, and both Marshall and White evidently saw
the Estelle “deliberate indifference” holding as quite limited.
Justice White now distinguished Estelle as involving a challenge “not to a general lack of access to medical care at the
prison, but to the allegedly inadequate delivery of that treatment to the plaintiff.”126 Its deliberate indifference approach,
he suggested, was properly restricted to that circumstance. In
more general cases, Justice White explained, a deliberate indifference test was
Not only . . . a departure from precedent, [but] likely . . .
impossible to apply in many cases. Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and inactions
121

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302.
Id. at 303.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 306.
125
Id. at 309 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
126
Id.
122
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by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes
over a long period of time. In those circumstances, it is far
from clear whose intent should be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance on this issue. In truth, intent
simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge
to an institution, such as a prison system.127

Moreover, said Justice White, the Court’s approach was
“unwise” because
[i]t leaves open the possibility, for example, that prison officials will be able to defeat a § 1983 action challenging inhumane prison conditions simply by showing that the
conditions are caused by insufficient funding from the state
legislature rather than by any deliberate indifference on the
part of the prison officials.128

This was an unappealing doctrinal result. A more attractive
standard, Justice White wrote, was objective:
[H]aving chosen to use imprisonment as a form of punishment, a State must ensure that the conditions in its prisons
comport with the “contemporary standard of decency” required by the Eighth Amendment. . . . The ultimate result of
today’s decision, I fear, is that “serious deprivations of basic
human needs” will go unredressed due to an unnecessary
and meaningless search for “deliberate indifference.”129

Next came the 1993 case Hudson v. McMillian. In this
damage action, the defendant corrections officers, at Louisiana’s Angola prison, had beaten the (restrained) prisoner. The
plaintiff won a trial verdict after presenting proof that he was
hurt but not grievously; he had some loosened teeth and some
bruises.130 The Court first held that the Whitley v. Albers “malicious[ ] and sadistic[ ] for the very purpose of causing harm”
standard applied to all challenges to uses of force in prison—
not just those occurring in the stress of a prison disturbance.131 But then it addressed whether the Wilson framework
would apply, as well, in use-of-force cases—whether the subjective scienter requirement would be coupled with an objective
requirement of demonstrated serious harm. In her opinion for
the Court, Justice O’Connor said there would be no serious
harm requirement imposed. She began by explaining that the
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
See id. at 6–7 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)).
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“seriousness” requirement was designed as a bulwark against
too much liability:
Because routine discomfort is “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,” “only
those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an
Eighth Amendment violation.” A similar analysis applies to
medical needs. Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate
indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are “serious.”132

The bulwark was not needed in use-of-force cases: “In the excessive force context, society’s expectations are different.
When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to
cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are
violated.” Justice O’Connor continued:
This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result
would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the
Eighth Amendment as it is today.133

(The Court did, however, hold that, absent particularly “repugnant” circumstances, “de minimis uses of physical force” were
not constitutionally actionable.134)
The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter. Justices Stevens and Blackmun disagreed from the left. Justice Stevens
took the position that the Whitley v. Albers malicious-and-sadistic standard should be applied only during a “serious prison
disturbance” but concurred in the rest of the opinion.135 Justice Blackmun reiterated his position that the Whitley v. Albers
standard was erroneous even in the context of a riot.136 Justice Thomas, newly on the Court, dissented, setting out a position far to the right of any that had been previously expressed—
that the Eighth Amendment simply does not regulate prison
conditions at all.137
132
Id. at 9 (citation omitted) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 9–10.
135
Id. at 12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
136
Id. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137
Justice Thomas’s dissent decried the “artificiality of applying the Eighth
Amendment to prisoner grievances, whether caused by the random misdeeds of
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The final pre-Kingsley case was Farmer v. Brennan, in
which the Court more carefully defined “deliberate indifference.” Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg) framed the choice as between
civil and criminal recklessness.138 The civil recklessness standard, the Court explained, labels “reckless” a “person . . . who
acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of
an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so
obvious that it should be known.”139 Civil recklessness is a
familiar standard in federal civil rights cases, because it is one
path to municipal constitutional tort liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Liability under that general civil rights statute exists
“[w]here a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available
to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice
that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in
the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens.”140
Criminal recklessness, by contrast, “generally permits a finding
of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of
which he is aware.”141 Justice Souter followed in Justice
Scalia’s path by explaining the choice of the latter, subjective
standard, as guided by the text of the Eighth Amendment:
The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.”
An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to
discourage[ ]. . . . But an official’s failure to alleviate a signifiprison officials or by official policy.” Id. at 22, n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Certainly if prison conditions were going to be considered under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, he said, serious injury should be considered a
prerequisite to constitutional liability. (That said, Justice Thomas described as
“unwarranted” the application in this non-riot situation of Whitley’s high standard of culpability.) Id. at 22, 24. In a case the following year, Helling v. McKinney, Thomas (again joined by Scalia) hardened that view: “[A]lthough the evidence
is not overwhelming, I believe that the text and history of the Eighth Amendment,
together with the decisions interpreting it, support the view that judges or juries—
but not jailers—impose ‘punishment.’” 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
138
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
139
Id. (citing WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 34, 213-214 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
140
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at
840 (describing Canton).
141
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (citing ROLLIN MORRIS PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 850–51 (3d ed. 1982); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 115–16, 120, 128 (2d ed. 1960); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), cmt. 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 1985)).
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cant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.142

Once a prison official knows of a risk of serious harm, the
Farmer Court emphasized, it is his obligation to “respond[ ]
reasonably to the risk,” though of course he may in the event
fail to avert the harm.143 That is, the Court said, in the event of
an official’s conscious awareness of serious risks, the Eighth
Amendment imposes a “duty . . . to ensure ‘reasonable
safety.’”144
Justices Blackmun and Stevens reiterated their oft-expressed objective position. To quote Blackmun’s concurrence:
[I]nhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment
even if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of
mind. This Court’s holding in Wilson v. Seiter, to the effect
that barbaric prison conditions may be beyond the reach of
the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed
individually culpable, in my view is insupportable in principle
and is inconsistent with our precedents interpreting the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Whether the Constitution has been violated “should turn on the character of
the punishment rather than the motivation of the individual
who inflicted it.” Wilson v. Seiter should be overruled.145

And Justice Thomas—this time without Justice Scalia—reiterated his position that “[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless imposed as
part of a sentence,” and accordingly declined to join the Court’s
opinion.146
D. The Problem with “Punishment”
The conditions-of-confinement/use-of-force case law just
described suffers from a glaring doctrinal problem, introduced
by Justice Scalia when, in his opinion for the Court in Wilson,
he centered the entire formal apparatus around a claim that
“punishment” definitionally requires the subjectively culpable
intent of a punisher.147 This issue is relevant not only to cases
brought under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
but to Fourteenth Amendment cases, as well; recall that Bell
held that jail conditions violate pretrial detainees’ rights when
142
143
144
145
146
147

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 851–52 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
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they “amount to punishment.”148 Two analytic flaws render
the argument incoherent.
First, the argument proves too much. If it were correct—if,
to quote Judge Posner, as quoted in Wilson, punishment requires “inten[t] to chastise or deter”149—deliberate indifference,
whose scienter does not rise to the level of “intent” (that is,
knowledge or purpose150) would be insufficient. Rather, the
appropriate liability standard would be Whitley’s intent-topunish standard. But no Justice has ever been willing to hold
that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment
only if the relevant prison official intended to punish. That
means that the deliberate indifference standard chosen in Wilson and elaborated in Farmer is left entirely unsupported.
More important, intentionality has a far weaker connection
to “punishment” than Justice Scalia suggests. Justice Scalia
premised the link between the Eighth Amendment’s reference
to “punishment” and an intent standard on Judge Posner’s
discussion, in the Seventh Circuit case Duckworth v. Franzen,
of the “accepted meaning” of the word and of a 1755 dictionary
definition.151 But the premise that punishment means “intended to chastise or deter” is erroneous. In Farmer, Justice
Blackmun persuasively offered some competing, less intentfocused dictionary definitions of punishment.152 Moreover,
many consequences of criminal misbehavior that are indisputably part of the punishment are not “intended to chastise or
deter.” Criminal restitution, for example, is intended to make
victims whole.153 In the era of self-supporting or profit-making
prisons, sentences of hard labor were intended to promote prof148

See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen,
780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)).
150
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., 2009).
151
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652
(7th Cir. 1985)).
152
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854–55 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“A prisoner may experience punishment when he suffers ‘severe, rough, or
disastrous treatment,’ see, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1843 (1961), regardless of whether a state actor intended the cruel treatment to
chastise or deter. See also Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English
Language 1736 (1923) (defining punishment as ‘[a]ny pain, suffering, or loss
inflicted on or suffered by a person because of a crime or evil-doing’) . . . .”
(emphasis added by Justice Blackmun)).
153
See, e.g., Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime:
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982); see also
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983) (identifying as one legitimate purpose of restitution the state’s “interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the
victims of crime”).
149
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itable use of prisoner labor.154 Conversely, deterrence is a
common purpose of both private and public civil law. The examples could multiply, but the point is simple; an “intent to
chastise or deter” is neither necessary nor sufficient to identify
punishment.155
Indeed, as Justice Stevens explained in Bell, the Court has
in other contexts deemed retribution and deterrence relevant
but not dispositive to the categorization of something as punishment.156 Consider the leading case explaining how judges
should decide whether a particular statutory consequence imposed on someone as a result of their conduct “is penal or[,
instead,] regulatory in character.”157 In the 1963 case Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court, per Justice Goldberg, identified seven factors “relevant to the inquiry,” noting that they
remained important even though they “may often point in differing directions.”158 I already quoted the factors in their entirety, in the discussion above of Bell. For current purposes,
the point is that “whether [a legislative prescription] will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence” is joined by many other Mendoza-Martinez factors.159
Moreover, in contrast to Justice Scalia’s emphasis in Wilson on
intent to punish as definitional, Mendoza-Martinez and later
cases make the intent of the body imposing a restriction important but again not dispositive. The Mendoza-Martinez factors
are explicitly about effects, not intent; they are offered as supplements or alternatives to an evaluation of intent.160 As the
Court developed in subsequent jurisprudence,
If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment,
that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact
a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must
further examine whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] inten154
See, e.g., Martin B. Miller, At Hard Labor: Rediscovering the 19th Century
Prison, 9 ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1974); GEORG RUSCHE, & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939).
155
For an extended discussion of this same point, see Alice Ristroph, State
Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353 (2008).
156
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
157
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
158
Id. at 169.
159
Id. at 168.
160
Mendoza-Martinez has itself been much criticized as unduly deferential.
See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution
and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 36 (2005); Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause
and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1281–82 (1998);
John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
653, 678–79 (2012).

R
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tion’ to deem it ‘civil.’” Because we “ordinarily defer to the
legislature’s stated intent,” “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”161

The point is that chastisement and deterrence are far from the
only purposes of punishment, and that intent to punish is
important but not definitional in identifying what punishment
is. Bell’s model of punishment as either subjective or objective
thus aligns conditions-of-confinement litigation with other
precedents; Wilson v. Seiter’s insistence to the contrary is
anomalous.
II
THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON
OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE FORCE
Thus far in this Article, I have limited my discussion to
doctrine. My goal to this point has been to summarize the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal analysis of both the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment regulation of jail and prison
operations, including both use of force and conditions of confinement, prior to the 2015 Kingsley opinion. I move in this
Part to a more normative analysis.
I will examine Kingsley’s answer in more detail in Part III.
But to summarize in advance, the Kingsley Court announces
that constitutional liability attaches when the force used
against a pretrial detainee is objectively unreasonable, evaluated “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20
vision of hindsight,” and deferring to the “legitimate interests
that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility
in which the individual is detained,” and to “‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.’”162 It is a good answer because it is
both morally attractive and capable of accurate implementation. To make that case, it is helpful to consider jail use of force
in much more detail. Jails can be dangerous places—and
some jail officers’ uses of force are needed to protect inmates
161
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (internal citations omitted); see also
id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I continue to think, however,
that this heightened burden makes sense only when the evidence of legislative
intent clearly points in the civil direction.”).
162
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540, 547 (1979)).
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from each other, for self-defense by officers, or to correct dangerous disorder. But other uses of force in jail are unduly
harsh or altogether unnecessary, for a variety of reasons. In
this Part, I look at four categories of excessive force common in
jails and prisons:
A.

Officers sometimes inflict obvious summary corporal
punishment.
B. Officers sometimes escalate a situation that could reasonably be managed with minor force, to cover summary
corporal punishment.
C. Officers sometimes use force to accomplish legitimate
purposes, indifferent to the pain or injury it inflicts.
D. Officers sometimes use force that is unreasonable under
the circumstances.

For each, I first provide a couple of examples, to allow better
understanding of the dynamics. Then I examine how the various potential liability standards operate in the particular
context.
A. Officers Sometimes Inflict Obvious Summary Corporal
Punishment
As corrections expert Steve J. Martin has summarized, “It
is an unfortunate reality of confinement operations that rogue
officers, rogue shifts, and rogue commands sometimes dispense outright corporal punishment on their charges.”163 Consider, for example, the 2014 findings of the U.S. Department of
Justice in its investigation of abuses of young inmates in the
New York City jails on Rikers Island:
Inmates are beaten as a form of punishment, sometimes in
apparent retribution for some perceived disrespectful conduct. Correction officers improperly use injurious force in
response to refusals to follow orders, verbal taunts, or insults, even when the inmate presents no threat to the safety
or security of staff or other inmates.164

The report sets out numerous examples:
163
Steve J. Martin, Staff Use of Force in United States Confinement Settings, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 145, 146 (2006).
164
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, S.D.N.Y., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF
THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 11 (2014),
[hereinafter DOJ RIKERS FINDINGS] https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public
/JC-NY-0062-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CEW-SGD8]; CRIPA Investigation of
NYC Department of Correction Jails on Rikers Island, JC-NY-0062 (S.D.N.Y), CIV.
RIGHTS LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14044
[https://perma.cc/D4SM-GPC4].
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• “On October 29, 2013, an inmate reportedly spat in the
face of an officer. The officer ‘punched the inmate in the
face and the inmate sat on the bench terminating the
incident.’”165
• “In January 2012, an inmate splashed a correction officer
with a liquid substance. While the inmate was flex-cuffed
and being escorted away, the correction officer approached him and started punching him in his facial area,
according to the investigating Captain’s report.”166
• “In January 2013, an RNDC correction officer punched an
inmate multiple times in the face and upper body area.
According to the inmate, the officer was upset because the
inmates had been playing with their food.”167

The Department of Justice made similar findings about force in
the Miami/Dade County jail:
MDCR [Miami Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation] corrections officers openly engage in abusive and retaliatory conduct, frequently resulting in injuries to prisoners. In
particular, there is a disturbing and distinct trend of MDCR
corrections officers reacting to low-level aggression from prisoners (e.g., abusive language or passive resistance to an order) by slapping or punching the prisoner in the head and
verbally provoking the prisoner to physically respond.168

Gruesome summary punishment may also occur in the
aftermath of a jail or prison disturbance, when officers sometimes make prisoners pay, in blood and pain, for the harm and
trouble they have caused. After the quelling of the Attica riot,
for example, historian Heather Thompson has documented
how
[f]or hours and days after state order had been fully restored,
troopers and COs forced men with multiple gunshot wounds
and shattered limbs to crawl naked towards the door of cell
block A, then forced them to run barefoot through the shards
of jagged glass that littered the entrance and, once they managed to make it through that narrow enclosure, then made
them run a gauntlet in which trooper clubs, fists, and gun
butts rained down on their bodies.169
165

DOJ RIKERS FINDINGS, supra note 164, at 13.
Id. at 15.
167
Id. at 18.
168
Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Releases Findings of Unconstitutional Conditions at Miami-Dade Jail Facilities, JUSTICE NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releasesfindings-unconstittuional-conditions-miami-dade-jail-facilities [https://
perma.cc/EBB8-5APG].
169
Heather Ann Thompson, Lessons from Attica: From Prisoner Rebellion to
Mass Incarceration and Back, J. RES. GROUP SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY (Nov. 8,
166
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Similar accounts are common for other prison riots, as well.170
Use of force as a summary corporal punishment is particularly offensive to judges, who tend to value the judicial monopoly on penal sanctioning. But even apart from that, obvious
summary punishment is important for both its prevalence and
its severity. Nonetheless, at first blush the problem of summary punishment is not a strong argument for an objective
reasonableness standard. After all, when inmate plaintiffs are
able to prove up such allegations of punitive purposes, these
kinds of uses of force are unconstitutional even under the
Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard. But that caveat—
when inmate plaintiffs are able to prove up such allegations—is
important. The Whitley standard raises a daunting adjudication hurdle. As a group of former corrections officials argued in
a Supreme Court amicus brief in Kingsley:
[A] subjective standard would erode staff accountability because instances of excessive force would be more difficult to
discipline. If a jail staff member can cure an otherwise unreasonable use of force by saying that he did not behave
recklessly or with malice, then a new and formidable barrier
to staff accountability will have been erected. Unlike the
question whether conduct was reasonable given the circumstances, jail administrators have an exceedingly difficult time
examining a staff member’s subjective intentions.171
2015), http://sdonline.org/66/lessons-from-attica-from-prisoner-rebellion-tomass-incarceration-and-back/ [https://perma.cc/CF23-98YS]; HEATHER ANN
THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 1971 AND ITS LEGACY
213 (2016); see also, e.g., Al-Jundi v. Mancusi, 113 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing Attica inmate testimony: “They were then ordered to
get up and move single file with their hands over their heads and ordered to run
‘the gauntlet’ through the A–Yard tunnel. As the inmates ran or crawled or stumbled in the tunnel leading to A–Block with their hands behind their heads and
stripped of their clothing, the corrections officers hit them with their clubs—
calling them ‘nigger’ or ‘nigger lover S.O.B.’ and other racial epithets. Each described the viciousness of the beatings with vivid detail.”).
170
See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SCHWARTZ ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., RIOT AT MAX: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MONTANA STATE
PRISON RIOT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1991, at 58 (Dec. 14, 1991) (on file with author)
(describing a post-riot gauntlet at the Montana State Prison in 1991: “handcuffed
inmates coming through the gauntlet were in some cases kicked, punched or hit
with batons”); Brief for Appellee at 8, United States v. Mathis, 31 F.3d 1174
(Table) (3d Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1052), 1994 WL 16176974, at *8 (“As a direct result
of these illegal orders, the remaining 15 or so inmates were grabbed off the bus
one at a time by two officers, run through a gauntlet of guards, who repeatedly
beat the handcuffed, shackled, and otherwise defenseless inmates with 36 inch
riot sticks without justification.”).
171
Brief of Former Corrections Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 21, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) (No.
14-6368), 2015 WL 1045423, at *21.
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What is true for jail administrators is even more true for inmates. Even when, in fact, officers engaged in summary corporal punishment, inmates—who nearly always proceed pro
se172—are unlikely to be able to prove it. So even if the Whitley
standard were asking the conceptually correct question, one
would expect many false negatives. As Alice Ristroph explains:
Whatever transpires in the nation’s prisons, the officials involved can nearly always claim that they did not intend for
the harm to occur. The burden to prove otherwise is on the
prisoner plaintiff, and it is a nearly impossible burden to
meet. And of course, the problem is not simply that prisoners, and courts, lack good evidence of prison officials’ intentions. The further problem—one familiar to us by now—is
that judgments about intentions are inevitably contestable.
When a judge or other third party tries to ascertain a state
actor’s intentions, she inevitably brings to bear her own
background knowledge and normative predilections. When
the constitutional law of punishment focuses on government
motives, outcomes depend on subjective [decision-maker] . . .
preferences.173

Against uses of force that constitute summary punishment, the
benefit of an objective reasonableness standard is administrability—a standard that turns on observable facts, and not
inferences about subjective intent, is bound to be more accurately applied.
B. Officers Sometimes Escalate a Situation that Could
Reasonably Be Managed with Minor Force, to
Cover Summary Corporal Punishment
Correctional officers who wish to muddy the evidentiary
waters further have an easy time. Again quoting penologist
Steve Martin:
It is not uncommon for ostensibly lawful applications of
physical force to mask the intentional infliction of punishment, retaliation or reprisal on prisoners. Manufacturing or
exaggerating the need to physically control a prisoner is one
means by which staff pretextually use force for inflicting punishment on a prisoner. An application of force that is legitimately initiated but which escalates to a level of force
disproportionate to the objective risks presented by the inmate can likewise be used pretextually by correctional personnel to punish prisoners. On those occasions in which
unnecessary or disproportionate force is applied for the pri172
173

Schlanger, Trends, supra note 11, at 167.
Ristroph, supra note 155, at 1404.

R
R
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mary purpose of inflicting punishment, retaliation, or reprisal, rather than control, such application of force constitutes
de facto corporal punishment regardless of its ostensible
justification.174

The Department of Justice’s Rikers Island findings described
above provide an example. In its report, the Department of
Justice found that Rikers “staff frequently continue to strike
inmates after they are clearly under control and effectively restrained, often attempting to justify their actions later by reporting that the inmate continued to resist.”175 For example:
In January 2013, after reportedly being disruptive while waiting to enter the RNDC dining hall, an inmate, who was on
suicide watch at the time, was taken down by a Captain and
punched repeatedly on his head and upper torso while he lay
face down on the ground covering his head with his hands.
The inmate told investigators that the Captain had “punched
[him] everywhere.” According to the Tour Commander’s report, the Captain’s use of force was “excessive and avoidable”
because the inmate presented no threat while lying on the
ground.176

In this incident, it seems that some force may have been appropriate at the start. The force used, however, was both more
than necessary (punches to the head) and continued for longer
than necessary (after the inmate was lying on the floor).
As with the gauntlet-type abuses described in subpart A,
uses of force that are escalated on purpose, and without need,
also constitute summary corporal punishment. But they are
even less susceptible to litigation-related regulation under the
Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard, because prisoners
are even less likely to be able to prove punitive intent, even
where it exists. Again, the objective reasonableness standard
is normatively attractive in this context not because of its substantive reach but its administrability advantage.
C. Officers Sometimes Use Excessive Force to Accomplish
Legitimate Purposes, Indifferent to the Pain or
Injury the Force Inflicts
In the paragraphs above, the officers’ purpose in using
force was to inflict pain. But many uses of force in jail occur
when officers simply don’t care about the pain they are inflicting—rather than relishing pain, they are indifferent to it.
174
175
176

Martin, supra note 163, at 147.
DOJ RIKERS FINDINGS, supra note 164, at 11.
Id. at 16.

R
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Here, I look at two different situations where this can occur:
use of pain compliance techniques in the absence of a security
need, and recklessly aggressive force.
Pain compliance—inducing obedience by application of
pain—has become a more available tactic in jail in recent years,
as standard weaponry has multiplied.177 Pepper spray and
Tasers, now routinely carried by officers in many jails,178 can
be used to incapacitate, but they can also be used, instead, to
cause pain.179 For example, an officer may seek to induce an
inmate to comply with an order—perhaps an order to return a
meal tray, or to put his hands behind his back for handcuffing
so he can be taken out of a high-security cell.180 Enforcing
institutional order is a legitimate purpose in a jail. So perhaps
177
I have been unable to find longitudinal data for jails and prisons, though I
would guess that the trends are similar, but some years behind, policing experience. In police departments, the increase in Taser authorization in recent years
has been sharp—from 7% of departments in 2000 to 81% in 2013. BRIAN A.
REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 248767, LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2015), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pdf [https://perma.cc/N267-JQZ6].
178
See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, NAT’L SHERIFF’S ASS’N, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICES: USE IN A CUSTODIAL SETTING 7, 9
(2009), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERFNSA_CED.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3GQC-YPPJ] (reporting that 64% of responding sheriff’s offices authorized the use of conducted energy devices (CED), where 86% of responding offices
ran detention facilities). I am unaware of any recent research on the prevalence of
pepper spray in jails or prisons, but my own experience is that its use is common
in many jurisdictions.
179
Tasers from a distance briefly incapacitate movement, but in a directcontact mode, as used against Kingsley himself, Tasers cause pain without incapacitation. See Brief for Respondents at 9 n.2, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.
Ct. 2466 (2015) (No. 14-6368), 2015 WL 1519055, at *9 (“The use of a Taser in
contact stun mode, although painful, does not result in neuromuscular incapacitation or injury. JA224-25; R154, pp. 67–68.”). This kind of use is often referred
to as “drive-stun.” The Taser company’s manual explains: “Drive-stun Taser use
produces a continuous extremely painful electrical shock useful for an officer
engaged in close hand to hand contact with a resisting subject; pain forces the
resisting subject to stop violently resisting and submit to handcuffing.” Second
Amended Individual Complaint for Damages at 4, Shreve v. Franklin Cty., No.
2:10-cv-244, 2010 WL 5173162 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2010), https://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-OH-0016-0003.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/S4PJ-PUGE]. Drive-stun use of a Taser is thus a pain compliance
technique, not an incapacitory response to a security threat. TASER, TASER X26C
OPERATING MANUAL 19 (2007), http://www.womenonguard.com/images/TASERX26c-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/82X2-P9FK] (“The drive-stun mode will not
cause NMI and generally becomes primarily a pain compliance option.”).
180
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-5.6 (3d ed. 2011), [hereinafter ABA, TREATMENT OF PRISONER
STANDARDS] http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Treatment_of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4VQC-KCNV] (explaining that excessive force is sometimes used in
such circumstances).
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first the officer issues the order. But the inmate does not comply. Then the officer threatens use of a Taser. The inmate,
again, does not comply. Then, even though non-compliance is
posing no particular threat to institutional safety and could
easily be addressed by a disciplinary or other non-force response, the officer uses the Taser for “pain compliance.” Having been shocked by the Taser, the inmate will often comply.
And of course, the possibility of actual use is what makes the
threat work in other incidents.
A horrifying video recently posted online shows one such
incident in New Mexico’s Bernalillo County jail, in Albuquerque. As described by the Albuquerque Journal, whose public
records request obtained the video’s release:
The video shows jail officers confronting [an inmate] over pictures—perhaps pages torn from a magazine—put up near
her bunk. [The inmate] won’t hold still, demanding to know
the name of the officer holding her against a wall. An officer
applies a stun gun to her.
The inmate, who is 4 feet, 11 inches tall, falls to the ground
and shrieks and sobs after that, so much so that jail officers
try repeatedly to get her to be quiet.
“Put her in a wrist lock,” one officer tells another, “and twist
her wrist until she shuts up and stops crying.”
[She] cries out in pain and continues to sob. Officers
threaten to spray her with Mace if she won’t be quiet. Eventually, she is sprayed in the face after she starts banging her
head on the floor.181

The video continues in this vein for an almost endless forty-five
minutes; even after the inmate is escorted/dragged to an infirmary and allowed to wash her face, repeated warnings of additional force are punctuated by the casual whistling of the
sergeant wearing the video camera.182 It is extremely hard to
watch. And the justification offered by the officers’ union president is beyond weak: as summarized by the Albuquerque Jour181
Dan McKay & Maggie Shepard, County Commission Chairman Wants Oversight Board to Study Jail Video, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 12, 2016, 11:42 PM), http:/
/www.abqjournal.com/824777/official-wants-oversight-board-to-studyvideo.html [https://perma.cc/G48U-2Z3V]; see Dan McKay, “Twist Her Wrist Until She Shuts Up,” ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:56 PM), http://
www.abqjournal.com/823915/county-releases-disturbing-video-of-jail-incident.html [https://perma.cc/WAM2-88F6]; Albuquerque J., Susie Chavez Jail
Video, YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?vZFf782fyJw [https://perma.cc/7L7L-8MCL].
182
Susie Chavez Jail Video, supra note 181, at 14:21.
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nal, he said, “[I]t’s appropriate to use force to get an inmate to
stop making noise, if the noise is keeping the inmate from
following commands.”183 But the noise was not keeping the
inmate from following commands, except the command to stop
crying—a command that had no institutional purpose.
Other incidents in this mold are summarized in a 2010
Department of Justice court filing in a case about Taser use in
the county jail in Columbus, Ohio:
Often, when an arrestee voices a verbal objection to having to
remove his or her clothes, or otherwise shows any lack of
cooperation during the booking process, such as failing to
answer routine medical questions from a nurse, a team of
deputies takes the person into a side tank, forcibly strips the
individual without telling the person why they are being
“dressed out,” and tases the person if there is any degree of
resistance, including passive or verbal resistance, to being
stripped.184

The same filing recounts that, similarly, officers at the Columbus jail routinely used Tasers to address a situation that did
indeed call for a physical intervention, but a less painful one,
by which officers could nonetheless easily “control the individual, or accomplish the task at hand.”185 The same Department
of Justice complaint describes an incident when
deputies came to a cell ostensibly to assist a mentally ill
inmate who was banging his head against his bed. Instead of
entering the cell to remove the inmate, a team of deputies
stood around outside the cell while a sergeant repeatedly
tased this inmate a total of fourteen times because he would
not slide out of the cell by himself.186

These kinds of pain compliance techniques are not summary
punishment—the goal truly is compliance, not retribution. But
the coercive method chosen drastically undervalues the pain
imposed.
Use of unduly aggressive tactics is a slightly different way
in which jail officers may undervalue pain they cause, when
they address an actual security risk not with pain compliance
but with other force. To illustrate the point, consider the tactics at issue in Whitley v. Albers, itself. Whitley was a damage
183

McKay & Shepard, supra note 181.
Petitioner’s Complaint in Intervention at 3, Shreve v. Franklin Cty., No.
2:10-cv-644, 2010 WL 5173162 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/JC-OH-0016-0010.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6AX-28
S6].
185
Id.
186
Id.
184
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action brought by a prisoner shot in the leg as officials quelled
a prison riot; Albers, the prisoner, had not participated in the
riot, indeed, he was assisting prison authorities.187 The 5–4
majority opinion by Justice O’Connor approved the district
court’s directed verdict for the defendant. She justified the
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm”188 standard by explaining:
It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in
good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of
confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official
control over a tumultuous cellblock. The infliction of pain in
the course of a prison security measure, therefore, does not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it
may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized
or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and
hence unnecessary in the strict sense.189

Under this test, the plaintiff lost; he had alleged not summary
punishment, but indifference to his safety. In his version of
events, prison officials were so hyped up and so angry that they
simply did not care if an inmate who had not participated in
creating the hostage situation they were faced with—indeed, an
inmate who had worked to keep a hostage safe—was hurt as
that situation was resolved. Whitley, the officer-defendant,
shouted, “Let’s go, let’s go. Shoot the bastards!” before he and
other officers charged into a cellblock and shot several nonrioting prisoners.190
As Justice Marshall explained in dissent, “[A]lthough most
of the inmates assembled in the area were clearly not participating in the misconduct, they received no warning, instructions, or opportunity to leave the area and return to their cells
before the officers started shooting.”191 On the plaintiff’s allegations, the officers in Whitley were thus responding to a real
security risk, but they were entirely cavalier as to the very
significant collateral damage to non-culpable inmates. In Albers’s version of events, Whitley and his colleagues failed to
give appropriate weight to the welfare of the inmate bystanders.
187

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 315 (1986).
Id. at 320–21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).
189
Id. at 319.
190
See id. at 331–32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191
Id. at 332.
188
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Neither pain compliance incidents like the ones described
above nor the unduly aggressive tactics on display in Whitley
violate the Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard. In using
pain compliance techniques, the officers’ ultimate goal is not
the pain they cause; their purpose is, rather, to induce compliance. They would be just as happy to see compliance based on
the order alone, or on the mere threat of Taser use. In the
aggressive tactics incidents, likewise, the goal is not punishment but control. In both, the officers’ actions thus pass muster under a standard whose verbiage includes references to
malice and sadism.
Pain compliance frequently does, however, violate either a
criminal or a civil recklessness standard. Consider Professor
Catherine Struve’s version of the latter standard; I have italicized the part that distinguishes civil from criminal recklessness: “(1) the force employed was unreasonable under the
circumstances, and (2) the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that employing that amount of force posed
a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.”192 Pain compliance to elicit obedience to an order capable of being enforced
another way—like the order to return a lunch tray—or unnecessary to enforce at all—like the order to stop crying—seems to
me to be unconstitutional under both the criminal and civil
recklessness standards. The level of force is unreasonable, and
the officer knows that using force exerts pain (that is the whole
point). The unduly aggressive force in Whitley, by contrast,
violates the civil recklessness but not the criminal recklessness
standard. The officer who shot Albers did not disregard a
known risk but one he should have known—the whole gravamen of the complaint is that although assessment of the situation would have been easy, he did not care enough to figure out
which inmates in the dayroom were rioters and which were not.
So if each of these examples is to be actionable, the constitutional liability standard must be civil recklessness or lower. I
think this is normatively attractive. In using either pain compliance or aggressive tactics that simply fail to consider the cost
to prisoners, officers act with unconcern about the pain and
harm they impose. Although this is not “malicious or sadistic,”
it does violate a crucial moral imperative, which is that the
state should value every person’s welfare. And surely this normative principle is beyond argument. It is appalling for a government official to use pain as a method to control another
192

Struve, supra note 22, at 1070 (emphasis added).
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human being, in the absence of a legitimate need that is—or at
least that reasonably seems, in the moment—pressing enough
to outweigh that pain. The officer who whistles his way past a
prisoner’s distress as she is pepper sprayed and her wrist is
twisted is the model, not of sadism, but of an equally abhorrent
nonchalance. The same is true of an officer who walks into a
dayroom and starts shooting without bothering to distinguish
between rioters and non-rioters. The point is, both pain compliance and other intentional uses of force that have a patently
insufficient security justification deny the full humanity of
their subjects, by failing to value their welfare. It may be unclear in any given case whether in fact there was insufficient
justification—but where the answer is clear, so too is the normative principle. The Whitley rule contradicts that principle,
and so does a criminal recklessness standard, whereas a standard of either civil recklessness or objective reasonableness
comport with it.
D. Officers Sometimes Use Force that Is Unreasonable
Under the Circumstances
Finally, even without any kind of punitive intent or recklessness, sometimes jail officers simply use more force than is
objectively needed, or use an unreasonably dangerous type of
force. Should the lesser culpability of the officer make a difference? I have a hard time understanding why it should. Consider four inmates who are tased for four different reasons: (a)
as punishment for calling an officer a rude name; (b) to induce
the return of a meal tray; (c) by a cowboy officer paying no
attention to which inmates are involved in an ongoing altercation; and (d) by an officer who unreasonably fails to notice that
he has ceased resisting. In each scenario, the prisoner experiences the same pain. Justice Holmes may have been correct
that “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked”193—but these are all kicks. We might want
our legal system to provide a different remedy for these different scenarios. Only more culpable conduct should lead to
criminal sanction against the officer, for example. And an injunction would be appropriate only if the violation is systemic
and redressable by the court order.194 But why would we want
our constitutional law to entirely excuse one or more of them?
It seems to me that the answer can only be instrumental: the
193
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown and Co. 1963) (1881).
194
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357–60 (1996).
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goal of whatever standard is chosen should be to encourage
only reasonable uses of force. Unreasonable uses of force are,
well, unreasonable, and undesirable for that reason. Aligning
the standard with the desired behavior seems simple and
attractive.
The federal government, state governments, corrections
standards-setting organizations, and jails themselves have insisted in their policies195 that the standard must be objective,
and that reasonable force is proportionate force. To quote a
U.S. Department of Justice letter finding systemically unconstitutional force at the jail in New Orleans, “appropriate uses of
force in a given circumstance should include a continuum of
interventions, and . . . the amount of force used should not be
disproportionate to the threat.”196 Disproportionate force can
result from poor training or poor execution. Implementing this
approach requires training and implementation of a variety of
tactics—including the tactic of waiting out a problem. Agencies
typically deem certain types of force—blows to the head and
chokeholds, for example, because they can cause brain damage and even death—out of bounds except as a last resort.197
There is, moreover, a further reason to avoid inquiry into
mental states. Officers’ mental states are themselves affected
by standards for behavior. A report by the Los Angeles Citizens’ Commission on Jail Violence, for example, found that in
the violent setting of the L.A. county jail system:
[T]olerance for excessive force used by at least some deputies
. . . has the danger of leading to what one expert cautioned
can become “abuses of force . . . so ‘normalized’ that deputies
can no longer perceive them as abusive.” This can perpetuate a damaging culture that can ultimately affect even those
deputies . . . who do not subscribe to these views and are
intent on doing the right thing.198

An amicus brief filed by the ACLU in Kingsley makes the point
more generally:
195
For a summary of each of these types of sources, see Brief of Former
Corrections Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 171, at *ii.
196
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., ORLEANS PARISH PRISON SYSTEM
FINDINGS 6, https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-LA-00280006.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F3C-ERSZ].
197
See DOJ RIKERS FINDING, supra note 164, at 11–12.
198
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE, REPORT OF
THE CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE 98 (2012), http://www.lacounty.gov/
files/CCJV-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA2C-9NSR].
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When objectively unreasonable uses of force pervade the jail
environment, that culture shapes guards’ subjective perceptions of the appropriateness of violence. . . . [T]he perpetrator
[of excessive force] should not be able to evade liability by
invoking a subjective perception of violence that reflects an
environment in which such violence is par for the course.199

To be clear, objective reasonableness does not require
perfection. Kingsley (and Graham v. Connor) instruct that the
objective inquiry should proceed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at
the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”200 So the
point here is not that jail officers are required to use surgical
precision when they deal with threats to safety and security. It
is worth noting, however, that concerns about unduly high
expectations given the stress of dangerous situations may be
inapposite for the many uses of force in jails and prisons that
are planned—for example, in Kingsley itself, when officers entered a locked cell to enforce an order.201 In the planned force
context, officers have time to check on various contingencies.
It might, for example, be objectively unreasonable for an officer
to direct pepper spray into the cell of a prisoner known by
officials to be asthmatic who is refusing to return a meal tray202
(the officer perhaps having neglected, unreasonably, to check
the prisoner’s medical status prior to the planned use of force).
Similarly, it might be unreasonable to fail to summon mental
health staff to assist with de-escalation of a confrontation with
a prisoner with mental illness.203 But whether the use of force
is planned or not, an objective reasonableness standard directs
attention where it normatively belongs: to the objective need for
the force, or lack thereof.
199
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union
of Wisconsin as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15–16, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) (No. 14-6368), 2015 WL 1045424, at *15–16.
200
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
201
See infra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
202
Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTIVENESS AND
SAFETY OF PEPPER SPRAY 1 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
195739.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZJ8-PXCV] (noting that “exposure to pepper
spray was a contributing cause of death in 2 of the 63 fatalities [that occurred incustody where pepper spray was used during the arrest], and both cases involved
people with asthma”); ABA, TREATMENT OF PRISONER STANDARDS, supra note 180, at
§ 23-5.6, 132 (“‘Force’ means offensive or defensive physical contact with a prisoner, including . . . discharge of chemical agents . . . .”).
203
Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Georgia, Regarding the Muscogee County Jail
5–18 (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-GA0003-0004.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM6Q-HDYP].
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Finally, I return to the administrability point. When liability has a subjective focus, the central factual issue—the officer’s state of mind—is extremely difficult to adjudicate
accurately. Plaintiffs will rarely have direct evidence, and officers will nearly always be able to argue that even if the force
they used was objectively excessive, they were honestly (if unreasonably) mistaken, rather than malicious, sadistic, or reckless. As a Kingsley amicus brief by retired corrections officials
argued,
Clear, enforceable standards ensure that jail staff members
know what they can and cannot do, and they guarantee that
officers who use excessive force can be held accountable for
their actions. Accountability, in turn, prevents systemic
problems with the use of excessive force—such as those seen
in New York, Los Angeles, and New Orleans—and it protects
against the spread of such systemic abuses to other
institutions.204

Returning to an objective focus aligns policy and law; the issue
that matters for good practice matters for law as well, and legal
institutions are actually capable of assessing it.
In sum, normative considerations counsel strongly in favor
of an objective reasonableness standard for constitutional adjudication of the lawfulness of custodial uses of force. And an
objective reasonableness standard is actually most susceptible
to accurate administration in litigation. I turn now to Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, in which the Court adopted an objective reasonableness standard for use of force against a pretrial
detainee.
III
KINGSLEY V. HENDRICKSON
In 2010, Michael Kingsley, the plaintiff in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, was detained in a Wisconsin county jail awaiting trial
on drug charges.205 After Kingsley refused several times to
remove a piece of paper covering the light fixture over his bed,
jail officers handcuffed and forcibly removed him from his cell.
He alleged that while he was handcuffed, the officer-defendants
first slammed his head into a concrete bed and then stunned
him with a Taser. (The officers agreed that a Taser had been
used but denied the rest; they justified the Taser use by asserting that it was intended to encourage the plaintiff to stop re204
Brief of Former Corrections Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 171, at *20.
205
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2470.
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sisting their attempts to remove his handcuffs.) At trial, the
jury found for the officers on jury instructions endorsing a
subjective recklessness standard; the appeal challenged the
instructions as legally erroneous.206
In this Part, I look in Section A at Kingsley’s majority opinion, by Justice Breyer, including examining two doctrinal paths
not taken—criminal recklessness (as in Farmer v. Brennan)
and civil recklessness (the standard plaintiffs unsuccessfully
proposed in Farmer). In Section B, I analyze Kingsley’s primary
dissent, by Justice Scalia. In Section C, I argue that Kingsley’s
Due Process standard necessarily applies not just to excessiveforce cases but to conditions-of-confinement claims as well.
A. The Kingsley Majority
In an opinion by Justice Breyer (joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan), the Supreme Court held in
Kingsley that when jail officials intentionally direct force
against a detainee, that force is unconstitutional if it is objectively unreasonable. The opinion explained that the use of
force at issue in Kingsley was “deliberate—i.e., purposeful or
knowing.”207 Thus, Justice Breyer stressed, nobody was disagreeing with the Court’s prior conclusion, in both a prior policing case and one about prisoners’ rights, that “liability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”208 Likewise, the Court put
off for another day an issue not raised by the case—what to do
with unintentional force (the example it cited was a police vehicular pursuit gone bad).209 Mere negligence would not be
enough, in that situation, it explained, while reserving the
question “[w]hether [a recklessness] standard might suffice for
liability in the case of an alleged mistreatment of a pretrial
detainee.”210 What Kingsley did decide was how constitutional
law should treat the “defendant’s state of mind with respect to
the proper interpretation of the force (a series of events in the
world) that the defendant deliberately (not accidentally or negligently) used.”211 The Court framed its choice as whether “a
§ 1983 excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee
must satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective stan206

Id. at 2470–71.
Id. at 2472.
208
Id. (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (emphasis in Kingsley)); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
209
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (1998).
210
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472.
211
Id.
207
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dard.”212 On that issue, the Court held, “[A] pretrial detainee
must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used
against him was objectively unreasonable.”213 The Court canvassed three reasons for its decision: precedent, feasibility, and
the safeguard of an ex ante perspective.
Justice Breyer began by emphasizing the objective approach’s consistency with precedent:
We have said that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial
detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” And in Bell, we explained that such “punishment”
can consist of actions taken with an “expressed intent to
punish.” But the Bell Court went on to explain that, in the
absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee
can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation to
that purpose.” The Bell Court applied this latter objective
standard to evaluate a variety of prison conditions, including
a prison’s practice of double-bunking. In doing so, it did not
consider the prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy. Rather, the Court examined objective evidence, such as
the size of the rooms and available amenities, before concluding that the conditions were reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial and did not
appear excessive in relation to that purpose.214

Thus, the Kingsley Court read the word “punishment” to encompass either official measures taken with “expressed intent
to punish” or a mismatch between “legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose[s]” and the action under challenge.215 The
former was subjective; the latter objective.
Second, the Court noted that “experience suggests that an
objective standard is workable.”216 A number of circuit courts
had already taken the approach the Court adopted, without ill
effect.217 In addition, an amicus brief by former corrections
officials cited abundant evidence that jail officers nationwide
were already trained and required by their agency policy to use
only objectively reasonable force.218
212

Id.
Id. at 2473.
214
Id. at 2473 (internal citations omitted).
215
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)).
216
Id. at 2474.
217
Id.
218
Brief of Former Corrections Administrators and Experts as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 171, at 8–18.
213
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And finally, the Court emphasized that its approach would
not undermine jailers’ ability to keep order, because the objective reasonableness of force should be evaluated “from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer,”
“tak[ing] account of the legitimate interests in managing a jail,
acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness analysis
that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain
order and institutional security is appropriate.”219
The Kingsley Court expressly rejected the defendants’ urging to apply to pretrial detainees, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Whitley “malicious[ ] and sadistic[ ] for the
very purpose of causing harm” standard applicable to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.220 The “most
important[ ]” reason, Justice Breyer explained, was that “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished
at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”221 Accordingly
the Court held erroneous the jury instructions under which the
jury had found for the defendants, and remanded the case for
further proceedings.222 However, at the same time as it dismissed the relevance of Eighth Amendment precedents, the
Court embraced Fourth Amendment case law, citing Graham v.
Connor a half-dozen times. In Graham, the Court (per Chief
Justice Rehnquist) established the general rule that the Fourth
Amendment requires police to use only objectively reasonable
force in non-detention settings.223 The Kingsley Court relied
on Graham to explain what “reasonable” means: that “reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case,’” and that “[a] court must make this determination
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”224
The Court also expressly rejected the defendants’ fallback
position—that liability could attach only if defendants were
subjectively reckless with respect to the excessiveness of force.
219

Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474.
Id. at 2476 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
221
Id. at 2475.
222
On remand, the 7th Circuit rejected the defendant-officers’ argument that
any error was harmless, and itself remanded the matter for retrial. On retrial, the
(new) jury was instructed that whether force was excessive was an entirely objective question, and on that instruction rendered a defense verdict. Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015); Jury Instructions at 5, Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, No. 10-cv-832-jdp (W.D. Wis. Feb. 26, 2016); Judgment, Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, No. 3:10-cv-832-jdp (W.D. Wis. Mar. 1, 2016).
223
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
224
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
220
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The jury instructions the Court found erroneous in Kingsley
had endorsed this standard of subjective recklessness. The
instructions stated, in part:
Excessive force means force applied recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of the time.
Thus, to succeed on his claim of excessive use of force, plaintiff must prove each of the following factors by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) Defendants used force on plaintiff;
(2) Defendants’ use of force was unreasonable in light of
the facts and circumstances of the time;
(3) Defendants knew that using force presented a risk of
harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded plaintiff’s
safety by failing to take reasonable measures to minimize the
risk of harm to plaintiff; and
(4) Defendants’ conduct caused harm to plaintiff.225

The defendant-officers’ brief in the Supreme Court contended
principally that the Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard
was correct—so the jury instruction was actually “unduly
favorable to the petitioner [plaintiff].”226 But “at an absolute
minimum,” the defendants argued, criminal recklessness, as in
the jury instruction, should set the floor for liability: “this
Court should require some showing of subjective intent, with a
recklessness standard providing the only viable alternative.”227
Neither the Kingsley majority nor dissent comprehensively analyzed this potential middle ground, which echoed the Court’s
approach, in Farmer v. Brennan,228 to prison conditions-ofconfinement challenges. Indeed, the majority never cited
Farmer and never used its language of “deliberate indifference.”
The Court simply reiterated that the jury instructions’ reference to recklessness “suggested the jury should weigh respondents’ subjective reasons for using force and subjective views
about the excessiveness of the force. As we have just held, that
was error.”229
The Court was less explicit but no less definitive in its
rejection of (objective) civil recklessness, the scienter standard
one tick more pro-plaintiff than criminal recklessness. When
civil recklessness is the standard, as the Court explained in
Farmer, plaintiffs can win their case by showing that defend225

Id. at 2471.
Brief for Respondents at 36, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015) (No. 14-6368), 2015 WL 1519055, at *36.
227
Id. at *34.
228
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
229
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2477.
226
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ants disregarded serious risks they should have known
about.230 In Farmer, when the Court chose a subjective criminal recklessness standard, it overrode plaintiff’s argument that
Wilson v. Seiter’s “deliberate indifference” language allowed liability based on civil recklessness—already used as an attribution rule in § 1983 cases against municipalities.231 Kingsley’s
rejection of civil recklessness was from the opposite direction.
When a jail official intentionally acts or fails to act, and harm
results, Kingsley—like Bell, before it—endorses liability when
the act or omission was objectively unreasonable. In both
Kingsley and Bell, the majorities not only fail to use the word
“reckless” to describe the chosen standard, they also omit any
of the other words associated with recklessness: “disregard,”
“wanton,” or “deliberate indifference.” The Kingsley and Bell
Courts thus spurned not just the Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard, and not just Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference/criminal recklessness standard, but also Wilson’s less
specified requirement of deliberate indifference altogether.
The Court’s “objective unreasonableness” language sounds
very like negligence.232 And, as customary for negligence adjudication, the Kingsley Court emphasized the required ex ante
perspective. The majority opinion explained, for example, that
reasonableness is to be evaluated “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew
at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”233 Yet the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to constitutionalize negligence law. The Court made the point firmly in Kingsley itself:
[A]s we have stated, “liability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849
(1998) (emphasis added). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“Historically, this guarantee of due
process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property”).234

This poses a bit of a puzzle. After all, legal analysis of states of
mind usually arrays them on a spectrum where the mindset
230

See supra text accompanying notes 139–41.
Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (No.
92-7247), 1993 WL 625980, at *10–11 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378 (1989)).
232
HOLMES, supra note 193, at 63–67; see Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 ER 490
(LRPC 1837) (Eng.).
233
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
234
Id. at 2472 (parallel citations omitted).

R

231

R
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one tick more culpable than negligence is civil recklessness,
and one more tick over is criminal recklessness.235 But, as just
seen, the Kingsley Court repudiates negligence, but also expressly rejects criminal recklessness and rules out without
comment the possibility of civil recklessness. Justice Breyer
solves the puzzle by emphasizing that uses of force must be
intentional to be unconstitutional: “Thus, if an officer’s Taser
goes off by accident or if an officer unintentionally trips and
falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial detainee
cannot prevail on an excessive force claim. But if the use of
force is deliberate—i.e., purposeful or knowing—the pretrial
detainee’s claim may proceed.”236 Of course not all deliberate/
purposeful/knowing uses of force are in any way culpable, but
nonetheless under Kingsley, the decision to use force renders
state actors susceptible to liability if that force is objectively
unreasonable.
This is a doctrinal distinction, but does it make sense? I
think it does. To understand why, it is useful to review why the
Court has declined to constitutionalize ordinary negligence
law, a topic most fully explored in Daniels v. Williams, in which
the Court disallowed due process liability for an inmate’s injury
caused by a Sheriff’s deputy’s alleged negligence in leaving a
pillow on a staircase. The Court explained, “It is no reflection
on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the
importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.”237 The key difference? “Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the
governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort
law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for
injuries that attend living together in society.”238 Returning to
Kingsley, this passage supports the Court’s holding: intentional force imposed under color of law certainly does relate to
the “large concerns of the governors and the governed.”239
At the end of the day, Kingsley was an unambiguous win
for pretrial detainee plaintiffs: where many lower courts had
required them to demonstrate both that force was, in fact, excessive, and that the defendant officials had a culpable state of
mind, Kingsley clarified that only the former showing is
required.
235
236
237
238
239

E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).
Id. at 332.
Id.; Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472.
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B. The Kingsley Dissent
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas,240 chiefly relying on a different reading of
the precedents. Justice Scalia claimed that the Court’s prior
“cases hold that the intentional infliction of punishment upon a
pretrial detainee may violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but
the infliction of ‘objectively unreasonable’ force, without more,
is not the intentional infliction of punishment.”241 Both Bell
and Wilson v. Seiter, Scalia said, dictated that “punishment”
means something intentional. Wilson was explicit on the point,
he emphasized, explaining that “[a]cting with the intent to punish means taking a ‘deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.’”242 And Scalia explained Bell’s mismatch approach as
evidentiary rather than conceptual, and, in any event, making
sense only in Bell’s conditions-of-confinement setting. He
wrote:
The conditions in which pretrial detainees are held, and the
security policies to which they are subject, are the result of
considered deliberation by the authority imposing the detention. If those conditions and policies lack any reasonable
relationship to a legitimate, nonpunitive goal, it is logical to
infer a punitive intent.243

For use of force, however, such an inference would be illogical,
Justice Scalia argued; a prison officer’s use of more force than
was, objectively, necessary, might well be based on a mistake
rather than a considered judgment.244 Accordingly Bell’s approach—already more government-friendly than the Court acknowledged, according to Justice Scalia—shouldn’t apply at
all.245

240
Justice Alito dissented separately, suggesting that the Court should not
have granted certiorari review of the case, because pretrial detainees might be
able to frame excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2479 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (“Our cases
have not resolved the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to
provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins, and
we do not attempt to answer that question today.”).
241
Id. at 2477 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).
243
Id. at 2478.
244
See id.
245
See id.
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C. Kingsley Requires an Objective Reasonableness
Conditions-of-Confinement Standard, Too
I have just argued that the Kingsley opinion’s resolution of
the precise issue before it—the standard for liability in an excessive force case brought by a pretrial detainee—is correct
and attractive. In this section, I explain how Kingsley’s approach also requires, logically, a similar standard focused on
objective unreasonableness in jail conditions-of-confinement
cases, as a matter of the same Bell precedent, and how this
outcome, as in the excessive force context, is consistent with
the Court’s longstanding reluctance to constitutionalize negligence law.
Doctrinally, the matter is not complicated: Kingsley’s objective standard necessarily governs pretrial conditions-of-confinement cases. After all, Kingsley rested its holding on its
reading of Bell—and Bell was a conditions case, not an excessive force case. Indeed, as explained above, Justice Scalia’s
Kingsley dissent argued that Bell’s “reasonable relation” test—
the one Kingsley interpreted to foreclose a subjective standard
of liability—was more appropriate in cases complaining about
jail conditions of confinement than those challenging uses of
force.246
In most circuits, this will require revisiting pre-Kingsley
case law. Prior to Kingsley, most of the federal appeals courts
conditioned constitutional liability for objectively dangerous
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees on plaintiffs’
additional demonstration of the subjective deliberate indifference by the officials involved. Court of Appeals decisions relied
jointly on the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent
and the intent-to-punish reading of Bell v. Wolfish that Kingsley rejected. A prominent example was the 2010 Ninth Circuit
precedent of Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa,247 a case
whose plaintiffs sued various jail officials and the County of
Contra Costa for failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent an inmate they knew was suicidal from killing himself.
The Court of Appeals held that the appropriate standard of
liability under the Fourteenth Amendment was the Wilson/
Farmer subjective deliberate indifference standard. The court
began with Bell, which it read to focus on punitive purpose.
Next, the Ninth Circuit explained that precedents relating to
246
Making this point, see Hatter v. Dyer, 154 F. Supp. 3d 940, 952–53 (C.D.
Cal. 2015).
247
591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the Eighth Amendment filled in what this meant more concretely. First, the opinion noted, Wilson equated intentional
punishment and a “culpable state of mind.”248 The Court of
Appeals next cited Farmer’s explanation that deliberate indifference was the same as (subjective) criminal recklessness.249
And so, the court concluded, the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of pretrial detainees were coincident with the Eighth
Amendment rights of post-conviction prisoners.250 Other
Courts of Appeals reached similar conclusions.
A few weeks after Kingsley, a Ninth Circuit panel issued an
opinion in Castro v. County of Los Angeles. Castro sued for the
devastating injuries he suffered when he was beaten by another inmate in a “sobering cell.” Officers had “ignored Castro’s
attempts to attract attention” and checked the cell only sporadically.251 In addition, notwithstanding the contrary requirements of California’s Minimum Standards for Adult Detention
Facilities, officials had decided against equipping the cell with
audio or video monitoring.252 The panel held that the new
Supreme Court precedent had “no bearing on the failure-toprotect claims presented here and in Clouthier,” because “[t]he
standard for a failure-to-protect claim—deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm—is completely different
from the standard for an excessive-force claim.”253 Judge Graber’s dissent, however, vehemently took the opposite position,
and the court granted rehearing en banc.254 On rehearing, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. Holding that Kingsley “expressly rejected the interpretation of Bell on which we had relied in
Clouthier,” the en banc court announced an objective standard
of liability in pretrial detention failure-to-protect cases.255
The overruled Castro panel stands close to alone in its
limited reading of Kingsley. Some post-Kingsley courts have,
with little or no discussion of or briefing on Kingsley, continued
(usually in dicta) to describe the liability standard in jail conditions cases as subjective.256 And other courts have expressly
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 1242.
Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994)).
See id. at 1241–43.
Castro v. Cty of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 665.
See id. at 679–82 (Graber, J., dissenting).
Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en

banc).
256
Court of Appeals cases in this category include Alderson v. Concordia Par.
Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that only the en banc
court could examine the issue under the court’s “rule of orderliness”); Morabito v.
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declined to address whether Kingsley entails a change from the
prior subjective liability standard to an objective one, because
resolution of the issue is unnecessary to the case before
them.257 But in the cases in which the issue has been briefed
and analyzed, all the Court of Appeals case law so far reads
Kingsley as requiring an objective standard in pretrial detention conditions cases;258 this includes cases in the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. I have uncovered only a
single district court decision taking the opposite approach on
the merits.259 Again, given that Bell itself was a conditions-ofconfinement case, and that the Kingsley Court premised its
approach on Bell, it is surely only a matter of time and full
briefing before the other Courts of Appeals insist on an objective standard for jail conditions cases.
However, in conditions-of-confinement cases, the lower
courts have differed on the subsidiary doctrinal question:
Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2015); Linden v. Piotrowski, 619 F. App’x
495, 500 (6th Cir. 2015); Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 617–18 (6th Cir.
2015); Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2015); McBride v. Houston
Cty. Health Care Auth., 658 F. App’x. 991, 999 (11th Cir. 2016). For a catalog of
district court opinions that have, since the Kingsley decision, applied a subjective
test in jail conditions cases without discussion, see Wilber v. Cty. of Jackson, No.
13-cv-14524, 2016 WL 892800, at *6 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016).
257
Court of Appeals cases in this category include: Miranda-Rivera v. ToledoDávila, 813 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2016); Ross v. Corr. Officers John and Jane Does
1–5, 610 F. App’x. 75, 76 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015); Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727,
731 (7th Cir. 2017); Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2016); Bailey v.
Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2016); Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964
n.3 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Brown, 654 F. App’x. 896, 906 n.6 (10th Cir.
2016).
258
Court of Appeals cases applying an objective standard to pretrial detention
conditions of confinement include: Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2d Cir.
2017); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017);
Ingram v. Cole Cty., 846 F.3d 282, 286 (8th Cir. 2017); Castro v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (limiting the holding to failure-toprotect cases).
259
Order at 15, Gomes v. Cty. of Lake, No. 1:12-cv-04439 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4,
2016) (declining to extend Kingsley’s objective approach to professional decisions
by medical staff in jail). Many district courts have declined to depart from circuit
case law; alterations, they have said, are up to the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g.,
Buffer v. Frazier, No. 14-2497-JDT-DKV, 2016 WL 1178810, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2016) (“Absent further guidance from the appellate courts, this Court
will continue to apply the [subjective] deliberate indifference analysis to claims
concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.”); Castillo v. Dubose, No. 3:14CV-987-WKW, 2017 WL 3765772, at *6 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted 2017 WL 3765745 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2017) (giving no
substantive analysis, but “an extensive search of post-Kingsley cases indicates
that the vast majority of federal courts, including [this court and] the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, have continued to utilize the deliberate indifference
standard in deciding claims of pretrial detainees which challenge medical treatment and other conditions”).
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Which objective standard applies—recklessness or reasonableness? In its en banc Castro decision, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the former. The court held that where a jail officer’s
non-force intentional action—for example, placing two inmates
in the same cell, or monitoring the cell only every half hour—
led to the challenged harm, liability attaches based on the
purely objective question, “Was there a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff that could have been eliminated
through reasonable and available measures that the officer did
not take, thus causing the injury that the plaintiff suffered?”260
The liability standard, the court said, was “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.”261 The prisoner-plaintiff should win only if
“[t]he defendant did not take reasonable available measures to
abate [a substantial risk of serious harm], even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated
the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of
the defendant’s conduct obvious.”262 The court explicitly
equated this to civil—that is, objective—recklessness, citing
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.263 In other words, what the
Ninth Circuit did in Castro was to maintain Wilson v. Seiter’s
“deliberate indifference” approach, but use an objective rather
than a subjective definition of deliberate indifference. It
adopted the standard the plaintiff unsuccessfully urged in
Farmer v. Brennan—the objective definition of deliberate indifference already used as an attribution rule in § 1983 municipal
liability cases to adjudicate a city’s liability.264
By contrast, in the other major Court of Appeals decision,
so far, to analyze Kingsley’s application to pretrial detention
conditions-of-confinement cases, the Second Circuit offers a
different doctrinal analysis. In a case about “appalling conditions”265 in Brooklyn Central Booking, Darnell v. Piniero, the
Second Circuit held earlier this year:
260

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070.
Id. at 1071.
262
Id.
263
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2016)
(“[R]ecognizing that ‘reckless disregard’ may be shown by an objective standard
under which an individual ‘is held to the realization of the aggravated risk which a
reasonable [person] in his place would have, although he does not himself have
it.’”)).
264
Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (No.
92-7247), 1993 WL 625980, at *10–11 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378 (1989)).
265
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2017).
261
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[T]o establish a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions
of confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the pretrial detainee must prove that the
defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged
condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should
have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety.266

That is, given objectively unreasonable pretrial detention conditions, liability can rest on the plaintiffs’ demonstration that a
jail official defendant either “acted intentionally to impose the
alleged condition,” or “recklessly failed to act with reasonable
care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial
detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should
have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety.”267
The en banc Castro opinion was an important win for its
plaintiff and other pretrial detainees. But its civil recklessness
standard still did not appreciate what Kingsley entails. As I
argued in Section A, Kingsley rejects both criminal and civil
recklessness as the liability standard. And relying as it does on
Bell, the Kingsley standard must apply both to excessive force
and conditions-of-confinement claims. So Castro must be
wrong, setting an unduly high bar to liability. This conclusion
is bolstered by a separate consideration. If Castro were correct,
the liability standard would be higher for conditions-of-confinement claims than those that allege excessive force. That simply
cannot be right. In Whitley, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the
Court in support of the Eighth Amendment use-of-force malicious-and-sadistic standard explained that the use-of-force
setting required more, not less, deference to prison officers’ inthe-moment decision making than appropriate in conditionsof-confinement cases. Her opinion distinguished Estelle and
its deliberate indifference approach; while suitable in a conditions case, she wrote, “In this [use-of-force] setting, a deliberate
indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate
hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a
second chance.”268 Compared to conditions of confinement,
266
267
268

Id. at 35.
Id.
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
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that is, use of force is adjudicated with more, not less, deference. So even if Kingsley’s reliance on Bell did not make the
point inescapable, Kingsley’s rejection of a recklessness liability rule for use of force requires, a fortiori, the same rule’s
rejection in a pretrial detention conditions-of-confinement
case.
The liability standard for intentional actions and omissions
is simpler: objective reasonableness. The Second Circuit got
this right in Darnell; although Kingsley explained that something more than negligence is required, that “something” is not
civil recklessness with respect to potential harm, but intentional conduct that, in the event, amounts to unreasonable
force or creates an objectively unreasonable degree of risk. Intentionally using force, intentionally declining to install audio
or video monitoring in a “sobering cell,” intentionally setting up
a cell’s toilet facilities, or intentionally placing a vulnerable pretrial detainee in that cell with a dangerous cellmate are not the
same as unintentionally leaving a pillow on a staircase.269
When intentional decisions create objectively unreasonable
conditions—whether or not anyone in particular exhibits recklessness—Kingsley dictates that the conditions are
unconstitutional.270
Unsurprisingly, since it was addressing use of force, not
conditions of confinement, the Kingsley liability standard is not
fully fleshed out for the latter type of case. Presumably more is
required than simply any intentional act. After all, it would be
the rare injury that does not involve an intentional act or omission. Even for a pillow negligently left on the staircase, no
doubt the sheriff’s deputy intentionally picked up the pillow
from wherever it belonged. There is, however, a compelling
account that explains when liability should attach. Justice
Stevens, all the way at the beginning of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence of conditions of confinement, offered an analysis
that seems to me precisely on point.
The key quote from the Stevens Estelle dissent is:
Of course, not every instance of improper health care violates
the Eighth Amendment. Like the rest of us, prisoners must
take the risk that a competent, diligent physician will make
269
Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (rejecting liability against
a deputy sheriff who unintentionally left a pillow on jail stairs).
270
Darnell does, however, extend Kingsley in one respect. Kingsley reserved
the issue of unintentional conduct, and in Darnell, the Second Circuit held that
reckless conduct, too, could create unconstitutional conditions of pretrial
detention.
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an error. Such an error may give rise to a tort claim but not
necessarily to a constitutional claim. But when the State
adds to this risk, as by providing a physician who does not
meet minimum standards of competence or diligence or who
cannot give adequate care because of an excessive caseload
or inadequate facilities, then the prisoner may suffer from a
breach of the State’s constitutional duty.271

As he explained, Justice Stevens’s standard excludes some
negligently caused harm. But his carve-out does not tighten
the scienter requirement to recklessness—even civil recklessness—by the doctor or a particular prison official. Rather, the
key to his analysis is the generally elevated level of risk created
by overall conditions.
Although Justice Stevens did not offer the comparison, a
helpful analogy is to tort liability for product defects. Under the
influential Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
liability attaches for harms caused to consumers when a product is sold “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer” even if “the seller has exercised all possible care.”272 This is often labeled “strict liability,” because the
test is based not on the defendant’s degree of care but on the
outcome.273 But it is very different from traditional flavors of
strict liability based on causation alone, such as the common
law regime for intrusions on land by livestock, or for harms
caused by wild animals.274 Tort law scholars have emphasized
that product liability proceeds without examining scienter, and
is premised neither on traditional negligence nor on most tradi271

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“One . . . who
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998) (“A product is defective when . . . it contains a manufacturing
defect. . . . A product . . . contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product.”).
273
See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 315–16 (3d ed. 2015) (“In contrast [to negligence], the very basis of strict products liability in tort is the supplier’s responsibility for harm caused by product defects regardless of fault.”).
274
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An owner or possessor of livestock or other
animals, except for dogs and cats, that intrude upon the land of another is subject
to strict liability for physical harm caused by the intrusion.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 22(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An
owner or possessor of a wild animal is subject to strict liability for physical harm
caused by the wild animal.”). For a discussion of the development and variation
from this original English common-law rule in the United States, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 22 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2010).
272
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tional strict liability.275 Rather, products liability exists only in
the presence of excessive danger; it is premised not merely on
causation but causation plus ex ante unreasonable risk. What
makes something a defect is precisely the unreasonable risk it
introduces. For manufacturing defect cases, the “defect” is the
difference between the intended and the actual product; for
design defect cases, the “defect” is the unacceptable risk introduced by the product.276
The test Justice Stevens proposed in Estelle stated a similar excessive-danger-based form of liability. The intentional
provision of undertrained, overworked, or under-resourced
medical care is the defect; when improper health care ensues,
the combination is enough to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Similarly, the intentional under-supervision of a
sobering cell is a defect; when a prisoner is beaten nearly to
death as a result, that too is unconstitutional. I don’t mean to
overstate the similarities here. The comparison to products
liability is an analogy, nothing more. Products liability, after
all, is at least somewhat broader than negligence, whereas the
liability Justice Stevens proposed in Estelle is narrower. The
point is, just as Kingsley does for excessive force, Justice Stevens’s Estelle dissent offers a liability standard for conditions of
confinement that is narrower than negligence, without tightening scienter.
IV
THE ORGANIZATIONAL NORMATIVE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL BAN
ON OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE FORCE OR CONDITIONS
In Part II, I offered normative arguments in favor of Kingsley’s objective reasonableness standard in light of the dynamics of individual officers’ excessive force against prisoners.
Here, I return to the normative, but focus on jails and prisons
as complex governmental organizations, and on conditions in
addition to force cases. This lens offers additional support for
Kingsley’s choice of an objective reasonableness standard and
its concomitant rejection of either criminal or civil recklessness
as the applicable standard. I argue in subpart A that Farmer’s
criminal recklessness standard, urged as a fallback by the defendants in Kingsley, constitutionally immunizes facilities in
which knowledge and decision making are separated, excusing
275
See OWEN, supra note 273, at 3–6. In some ways, products liability is akin
to the common law strict liability for “abnormally dangerous activities.” Id. at
314–16.
276
See id. at 445–48.

R
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and even encouraging official ignorance about serious risks.
By contrast, an objective standard encourages appropriate risk
regulation. In subpart B I suggest that, similarly, an objective
standard avoids ratifying underfunding of jails and prisons as
a constitutional excuse for inhumane conditions.
A. Solving the Problem of Culpable Ignorance
Many observers before me have pointed out that a subjective recklessness standard immunizes even culpable ignorance, whereas objective recklessness or reasonableness
makes culpable ignorance actionable.277 Farmer held that
prison officials are liable only for risks they actually know
about; the Farmer Court rejected a civil recklessness standard
that would have imposed liability for disregard of obvious risks,
adopting instead a criminal recklessness standard violated
“only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is
aware.”278 In many settings, a rule that the Constitution does
not require officials to become informed about risks would
work hand-in-glove with the Supreme Court’s general reluctance to constitutionalize affirmative duties. For example, the
Court has insisted that no constitutional breach occurs when
police fail to intervene to protect a crime victim—even if a defendant police officer knows about the risk that victim faces
and could easily prevent the looming harm.279 If there is no
constitutional obligation to intervene even when a risk is
known, a constitutional obligation to become informed would
make no sense.
But jail and prison are exceptions to the general rule
against constitutionalization of affirmative duties. Jail and
prison render inmates unable to protect themselves without
state participation; they are unable to lock their doors, unable
to exit a threatening situation, unable to seek medical treatment, unable to buy food, and so on. For this reason, the
Supreme Court has explained, the Constitution does, indeed,
impose an affirmative obligation to protect inmates from serious risks of harm280 and to provide them “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.”281 As the Court has noted (in
dicta), “in the custodial situation of a prison, forethought about
277

See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 44, at 945; Struve, supra note 22, at 1069.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
279
See Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
202–03 (1989); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768–69 (2005).
280
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200.
281
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
278

R
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an inmate’s welfare is not only feasible but obligatory.”282 In
this context, as in other contexts of affirmative duties, it is
anomalous to immunize ignorance.283 Consider, for example,
the affirmative duties of parents. Parents cannot defend
against parental neglect charges by asserting that they simply
did not notice their child starving or suffering from a medical
issue;284 the failure to notice is, if anything, confirmation of the
neglect accusation. Similarly, an official’s unreasonable failure
to notice a dangerous situation is just as individually culpable
as a failure to act reasonably to avert a noticed danger. And it
is just as harmful. As Sharon Dolovich has argued in an extensive exploration of Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement doctrine, “[W]hen prison officials do not pay attention,
prisoners may be exposed to the worst forms of suffering and
abuse.”285

282

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998).
Cf. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 354 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a State assumes sole responsibility for one’s physical security and
then ignores his call for help, the State cannot claim that it did not know a
subsequent injury was likely to occur. Under such circumstances, the State
should not automatically be excused from responsibility. In the context of prisons, this means that once the State has taken away an inmate’s means of protecting himself from attack by other inmates, a prison official’s negligence in
providing protection can amount to a deprivation of the inmate’s liberty, at least
absent extenuating circumstances.”).
284
See State ex rel. N.K.C., 995 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (“Perhaps the
mother was unaware of the severity of her child’s condition when he appeared
limp and lethargic. Perhaps she did not fully understand the precise significance
of fixed pupils and the child’s inability to nurse. A reasonable parent standard
may accommodate the cautious and the hesitant, but it cannot accommodate
inaction in the face of an obvious cause for immediate concern.” (footnote omitted)), cited as offering useful guidance in JOHN E.B. MYERS, 1 MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN
CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE CASES 319 (3d ed. 2005); People v. Northrup,
442 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (“The record does, however, support a
finding of guilt of the lesser included charge of criminally negligent homicide, for
defendant’s failure to perceive that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk
Chad would die was a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable
parent would have exercised in this situation.” (citations omitted)); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. 1973) (“[T]he record evidence warranted the verdict that the defendants’ failure to provide prompt medical care for their son
reflected a culpable failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
[parent] would observe.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(“[D]efendant’s maintenance of her son’s condition of dehydration and undernutrition, without perceiving the grave risk to his young life, was such a ‘“gross
deviation” from reasonable care’ so as to constitute criminally negligent homicide.” (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692, 696 (N.Y.
1990))).
285
Dolovich, supra note 44, at 892.
283
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Indeed, it is possible that Farmer actually makes things
worse by discouraging situational awareness. In the same article, Dolovich suggests that by “hold[ing] officers liable only for
those risks they happen to notice,” Farmer’s conscious disregard rule “creates incentives for officers not to notice.”286 The
Farmer Court itself gave this incentive problem short shrift:
We doubt that a subjective approach will present prison officials with any serious motivation “to take refuge in the zone
between ‘ignorance of obvious risks’ and ‘actual knowledge of
risks.’” Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge
of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact
that the risk was obvious.287

But the Court’s answer is not very satisfying; even if juries can
see through phony ignorance, that does not address the reality
that ignorance is frequently not phony at all. Correctional staff
members’ ignorance of particular risks to prisoners, after all, is
not an occasional, regrettable oddity, but the routine result of
modern, bureaucratized operation of a complex institution.
David Luban, Alan Strudler, and David Wasserman explained
several decades ago that “fragmentation of knowledge and responsibility in large organizations, including government, business corporations, and professional groups”288 is
commonplace. The problem is not that institutions are warping their structure in order to evade liability. Rather, the fragmented responsibility follows from ordinary hierarchical,
specialized bureaucratic design, which often separates decision making and decision implementation into different organizational locations.289 That is, the person assigned by the
organization to understand the facts on the ground—in a jail or
a prison, the officer who sees evidence of a particular inmate’s
need for protection from a violent cellmate (e.g., a line-level
correctional officer)—may not be the person who makes housing assignments (e.g., a unit administrator), much less the person who decides how housing assignments are made (e.g., a
deputy warden or warden). Thus the officer who knows of the
286

Id.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (citation omitted).
288
David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in
the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2355 (1992).
289
Such separation is far from universal, see MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (2d ed. 2010), but it is
common.
287
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risk may lack authority or opportunity to alleviate that risk,
while the officer who creates the risk may lack specific knowledge about it.290 Moreover, even when knowledge and responsibility are assigned to a single location within a bureaucracy,
hand-off problems (endemic to so many institutions) obstruct
safe practices; without appropriate procedures, shift change
often means that the officer with knowledge of a problem leaves
no trace of that knowledge with his next-shift analog.291
Under Farmer’s subjective approach, in short, easily preventable harm may incur no constitutional liability. Even if a
requested cell move might easily have prevented a serious assault, only if—unusually—a particular defendant both knew
the individual circumstances and was authorized to approve
the move will liability follow. This is what Luban, Strudler, and
Wasserman called the “problem of fragmented knowledge.”292
Farmer’s response is, to quote the same article, simply to “accept as a tragic fact of modern existence that organizational
wrongs may be committed for which no one—neither individuals nor the organization—can rightly be held responsible.”293
But normatively, the problem of fragmented knowledge demands a solution—use of an objective rather than subjective
standard.
This argument, however, pushes the liability standard only
to objective recklessness. I have already offered, in subpart
II.D, several reasons why an objective reasonableness standard
is preferable—because objectively reasonable conduct is the
goal, and it is best to align the liability and conduct rule, and
because objective reasonableness is the most capable of accurate administration in litigation. To state the points more generally, the reasons to like Kingsley’s choice of a reasonableness
rather than a recklessness standard are the ordinary advantages of negligence liability: liability for unreasonable conduct
incentivizes reasonable behavior, allocates loss to the party
more responsible for the loss, and implements the moral insight that everyone’s welfare matters. When organizations that
pay damages—like jails and prisons, when their staff are
290
I am not arguing that Farmer blocks liability in all such circumstances; a
plaintiff may be able to persuade a judge or jury that a particular officer both
knew of the risk and failed to reasonably address it.
291
See Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The
Potential Impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 2059, 2095 (2016).
292
Luban, Strudler & Wasserman, supra note 288, at 2365.
293
Id.

R
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sued294—care about their budgets (of course not all organizations do care),295 they have abundant methods to translate
damages incentives into behavioral changes. When the liability
standard is more forgiving than the desired standard of conduct—as a recklessness standard is—that muddles both the
incentives and the moral account. Kingsley’s reasonableness
approach instead aligns doctrine with the conduct towards pretrial detainees that our polity desires.
B. Solving the Problem of a Cost Defense
A final normative point is that Kingsley’s rejection of individual culpability as the constitutional touchstone avoids what
I will call the “cost defense problem.” Returning to Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Farmer, he explained the point:
Wilson’s myopic focus on the intentions of prison officials is
also mistaken. Where a legislature refuses to fund a prison
adequately, the resulting barbaric conditions should not be
immune from constitutional scrutiny simply because no
prison official acted culpably. Wilson failed to recognize that
“state-sanctioned punishment consists not so much of specific acts attributable to individual state officials, but more of
a cumulative agglomeration of action (and inaction) on an
institutional level.”296

The argument seems to me compelling: If individual culpability
is essential for a constitutional violation, a cost defense to constitutional liability follows logically (if not inevitably). After all,
no individual defendant has the ability to solve problems that
stem from decisions by a funder—usually a legislature—to provide only inadequate resources. And there is nothing individually culpable about the resulting failures. But allowing officials
to exculpate themselves by pointing to the resource constraints
imposed upon them by legislative bodies, even if those resource
constraints are unreasonable, would render constitutional protections nearly meaningless.
The Supreme Court has not fully analyzed the issue of the
“cost defense” in civil rights litigation. In Block v. Rutherford, in
1984, the Court listed the “substantial” “costs—financial and
otherwise”—of individuated pre- and post-visit searches of pretrial detainees as something “a facility’s administrators might
294

Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
For a discussion of this issue for jails and prisons, see Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, supra note 11, at 1681.
296
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 855 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(quoting The Supreme Court: 1990 Term Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177,
243 (1991)).
295
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reasonably attempt to avoid,”297 and, in a footnote, weighed
those costs against a finding of Fourteenth Amendment violation under Bell.298 But the Court has never again adverted to
Block’s treatment of costs, and has at other times been far less
friendly to a cost defense. In fact, two cases implicitly reject the
defense. First, in Bell, when the Supreme Court allowed the
government to defend harsh conditions of pretrial detention by
explaining how those conditions served a legitimate non-punitive purpose, that approach sub silentio rejected an invocation
of economy as such a purpose. As Justice Stevens pointed out
in the dissent, if costs count, “[a]ny restriction that may reduce
the cost of the facility’s warehousing function could not be
characterized as ‘arbitrary or purposeless’ and could not be
‘conclusively shown’ to have no reasonable relation to the Government’s mission.”299 For Bell to have any teeth—including
on its own facts—costs, again, must not count. And second, in
Whitley v. Albers, the case in which Justice O’Connor set out
the malicious-and-sadistic standard by which excessive force
is adjudicated under the Eighth Amendment, she distinguished use of force from medical care: “The deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle was appropriate in the
context presented in that case because the State’s responsibility to attend to the medical needs of prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally important governmental
responsibilities.”300 If costs were permissibly weighed in the
constitutional balance, the quoted statement would be selfevidently false. So costs must not count.
In any event, Justice White’s concurrence in the judgment
in Wilson, in 1991, warned that the Court’s holding “leaves
open the possibility . . . that prison officials will be able to
defeat a § 1983 action challenging inhumane prison conditions
simply by showing that the conditions are caused by insufficient funding from the state legislature rather than by any
deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials.”301
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion expressed some skepticism
that this was a problem worth taking seriously:
The United States suggests that a state-of-mind inquiry
might allow officials to interpose the defense that, despite
good-faith efforts to obtain funding, fiscal constraints beyond
297

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 n.9 (1984).
See id. at 600 n.10.
299
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 585 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
301
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
298
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their control prevent the elimination of inhumane conditions.
Even if that were so, it is hard to understand how it could
control the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” in
the Eighth Amendment. An intent requirement is either implicit in the word “punishment” or is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy considerations might
dictate. At any rate, the validity of a “cost” defense as negating the requisite intent is not at issue in this case, since
respondents have never advanced it. Nor, we might note, is
there any indication that other officials have sought to use
such a defense to avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U. S. 97 (1976).302

For obvious reasons, omitting costs from the constitutional
calculus in conditions-of-confinement challenges is a more attractive way of thinking about the Constitution’s protections. A
constitutional right trumped by (nearly inevitable) resource
constraints is an awfully thin right. Yet if the subjective culpability of an individual defendant is paramount—as the Court
held in Wilson—a cost defense seems to follow. In a 2015 en
banc Ninth Circuit opinion, Peralta v. Dillard, Judge Kozinski
wrote that, given the Supreme Court’s insistence on an intent
requirement, “[a] prison medical official who fails to provide
needed treatment because he lacks the necessary resources
can hardly be said to have intended to punish the inmate.”303
An intent requirement leads if not inevitably then at least arguably to a cost defense that would often render illusory constitutional protection against inhumane conditions of
confinement. Focusing on the conditions actually experienced,
rather than either intentional or reckless misconduct by jail or
prison officials, suffers no such flaw.

302

Id. at 301–02.
744 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 946
(2015). Judge Kozinski emphasized that injunctive relief would still be available,
without explaining why the limited liability he explicated varied based on requested remedy. See id. at 1099 (“[T]he majority’s distinction between damages
and injunctive relief finds no support in the Eighth Amendment. . . . [I]n the eyes
of the majority, refusing to treat an inmate because of budget constraints is cruel
and unusual when an inmate requests equitable relief, but somehow not so when
he requests monetary relief.” (Hurwitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part)).
303
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V
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT “MALICIOUS AND SADISTIC” AND
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARDS ARE
WRONG, TOO
I move now to cases brought by convicted prisoners rather
than pretrial detainees, under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause rather than under the Due
Process Clauses. I argue in this part that notwithstanding
these different sources underlying liability, the implementing
doctrine should be the same objective reasonableness standard. American jail and prison officials do not distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners, in either
conditions-of-confinement or use-of-force policy. The Constitution is best read to do the same.
It is worth noting, practically, that of the nearly 750,000
people housed in American jails, over a third are convicted
prisoners.304 Post-conviction prisoners may be confined in a
jail while they await sentencing, if they are convicted of a misdemeanor, or when their felony sentence is less than some
length chosen by the state for prison incarceration. (This is
often less than one year, but in some states can be far
longer.)305 In addition, over 80,000 “state prisoners” are, in
fact, housed in county jails.306 Moreover, in many states, jails
do not systematically separate pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners; housing assignments are made on the basis of
more individualized risk and supervision factors. That is, operationally, jail classification experts find that it is safer to mix
pretrial and post-conviction populations, separating people
based on risk and need rather than status.307 So if the Constitution imposes different liability standards for pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners, those differences cannot,
practically, be reflected in different policy, training, or treatment. Of course liability standards can and do diverge from
standards for conduct. For example, “mere . . . malpractice”308
304
TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4JB-8QKW].
305
See Brian Albert, Nat’l Assoc. of Ctys. Research Div., State Prisoners in
County Jails 3 (2010), http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/
State%20Prisoners%20in%20County%20Jails%20Updated.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WQ7A-7QBQ].
306
CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 16. For discussion, see ALBERT, supra
note 305.
307
See ABA, TREATMENT OF PRISONER STANDARDS, supra note 180, at 40–43.
308
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976).
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does not engender constitutional liability under Estelle, but
prison and jail policies nonetheless require their doctors to
practice medicine reasonably, consistent with the community
standard of care.309 Nonetheless, it is an important reality of
American incarceration that there is little distinction made in
practice between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners
with respect to either use of force or conditions of confinement.
(In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, the Court focused on operational considerations to
hold that pretrial detainees housed in a jail’s general population do not have any more right to avoid a strip search than do
convicted prisoners.310)
Considering the issues doctrinally rather than operationally, the Kingsley Court itself acknowledged that its reasoning
casts doubt on Whitley’s malicious-and-sadistic standard in
the prison context as well. Justice Breyer essentially invited
future challenges by noting:
[O]ur view that an objective standard is appropriate in the
context of excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the context of
excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners. We
are not confronted with such a claim, however, so we need
not address that issue today.311

I have already argued (in subpart I.D.) that both Whitley’s malicious-and-sadistic standard and Wilson/Farmer’s deliberate
indifference standard depend on the flimsy foundation of Justice Scalia’s misreading of the word “punishment.” Kingsley
entirely rejects that understanding of “punishment” as necessarily intentional, holding, instead, that punishment can be
demonstrated with either a subjective or objective showing; it
can consist of actions taken with “expressed intent to punish”
or of conditions creating a mismatch between “legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose[s]” and the action under
challenge.312 That rejection dictates not just the standard for
pretrial detainees but for convicted prisoners as well; Whitley
and Wilson/Farmer’s foundation are gone.
309
See NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN
JAILS (2014); AM. CORR. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS vii (1st ed. 2002); AM. CORR. ASS’N,
PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES (4th ed.
2004).
310
566 U.S. 318, 335–39 (2012).
311
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 (2015).
312
Id. at 2473 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)).
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Of course “punishment” could mean something different in
the Kingsley/Bell Fourteenth Amendment context than for
purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.313
But recall that the Wilson Court did not bolster its reading of
the word based on context, policy, or normative considerations.
Quite the contrary. In Wilson, Justice Scalia described the
Court’s requirement of subjective culpability as entirely linguistic, apolitical, and beyond these kinds of arguments:
The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections
of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans
only cruel and unusual punishment. . . . An intent requirement is either implicit in the word ‘punishment’ or is not; it
cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy considerations might dictate.314

And Justice Scalia’s Kingsley dissent declared the Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment concepts of punishment one and the same, protesting the Court’s rejection of the
Wilson approach.315 That is, Justice Scalia—who wrote Wilson—thought that Kingsley was inconsistent with Wilson. He
was correct; if Kingsley is right (as I have argued it is), then
Wilson is wrong, and its approach must be jettisoned.
The Kingsley Court, however, didn’t quite say that. While
inviting a future Eighth Amendment challenge, the Kingsley
majority instead offered the following hint on its approach to
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, compared to the
Due Process Clause:
The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the
claims often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all,
much less “maliciously and sadistically.” Thus, there is no
need here, as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case,
to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.316

In other words, where a pretrial detainee can win a lawsuit
based on her demonstration that she was subjected to punishment, a convicted prisoner has to show more. For convicted
prisoners, only “cruel and unusual punishments” are uncon313
Cf. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933) (“The tendency to assume that a word which
appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one
purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all
through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.”).
314
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–02 (1991).
315
See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2477–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316
Id. at 2475 (citations omitted).
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stitutional. Prior to Kingsley, the Supreme Court had not
clearly used the words “cruel and unusual” as a textual hook in
a conditions/use-of-force case, but it did on at least one other
occasion hint that it might do so, in the Fourth Amendment
case Graham v. Connor. There, the Court noted “the Eighth
Amendment terms ‘cruel’ and ‘punishments’ clearly suggest
some inquiry into subjective state of mind.”317
The implication of all these gestures toward the phrase
“cruel and unusual” is that the Whitley and Wilson/Farmer
subjective standards can’t survive on their foundation of the
Eighth Amendment’s reference to “punishment”—but they
might survive if premised, instead, on the adjectives that precede that reference. I think this is incorrect; a simple swap of
the constitutional text under consideration from “punishment”
to “cruel and unusual” cannot support a culpability-based focus. Both Eighth Amendment case law in other contexts and
scholarship suggest that Graham’s off-handed assurance that
“cruel” “clearly suggest[s] some inquiry into subjective state of
mind” was made with undue confidence.318
The doctrinal point is easily made. There is fully developed
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence elaborating on the meaning
of “cruel and unusual,” with respect to sentencing. In that
jurisprudence, the Court has implemented the constitutional
ban on cruelty by testing state-inflicted punishments against
the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”319 The Court has insisted on use of “objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”320 The mental
state of any state actor plays no part of the “cruel and unusual”
inquiry.
Recent scholarship exploring the interpretation of the entire Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in a conditions-ofconfinement context has confirmed the point. Scholars offer
various bottom lines, but they share the position that the constitutional text cannot justify an intent-based constitutional
approach. For those moved by an original intent methodology,
John Stinneford comprehensively canvasses historical materials to understand the contemporary meaning of the words
“cruel and unusual.” He finds abundant eighteenth century
317

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989).
Id.
319
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
320
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1980); see also, e.g., Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482 (2012) (describing the search for “objective indicia of
society’s standards” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010)).
318
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evidence that the word “cruel” “refers to the pain caused by a
given punishment, not the punisher’s attitude toward that
pain.”321 That is, a cruel punishment is “one whose effects are
unduly harsh, not as one imposed with a cruel intent.”322 He
argues further that a “punishment is cruel and unusual if it is
unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior punishment practice”323: “The key issue is not the public officials’ cruel intent
regarding this issue, but the likelihood and severity of the harm
as compared to longstanding prior practice.”324
Applying this reading to conditions of confinement, he concludes that “[i]f officials create or permit conditions that significantly enhance the risk of severe harm, as compared to
longstanding prior practice, the resulting punishment may appropriately be called cruel and unusual.”325 He offers several
examples, including “[p]utting 2,000 prisoners in a facility traditionally used for 1,000 prisoners, . . . when it predictably
results in higher rates of assault and rape”; “[p]lacing prisoners
in solitary confinement for much longer periods of time than
was traditionally permissible, which predictably causes severe
psychological and sometimes physical harm”; and “[p]lacing a
person with strong feminine physical characteristics in a general male population.”326 Combining research into a different
set of historical materials—sources addressing the permissible
punishment of slaves—with modern Eighth Amendment sentencing jurisprudence, Alex Reinert likewise suggests that the
phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” evidences little interest in the intent of the punisher.327 Rather, he says, it connotes an idea about proportionality; conditions-of-confinement
doctrine should therefore import this concept, reducing the
“emphasis on subjective states of mind of prison officials.”328
Other scholars taking a more explicitly normative approach similarly find no warrant for a subjective focus in the
321
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 471
(2017).
322
Id. at 473–74.
323
Id. at 497.
324
Id. at 503.
325
Id. at 502.
326
Id. at 502–03.
327
See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV.
817, 833–34 (2016); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 53, 68–71 (2009).
328
Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation
Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, supra note 327, at 76.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN203.txt

430

unknown

Seq: 74

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

19-JAN-18

13:41

[Vol. 103:357

word “cruel.” Sharon Dolovich argues that all post-conviction
imprisonment constitutes punishment, and that “[a]lthough
the Clause prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, its normative force derives chiefly from its use of the word cruel.”329
Based on non-conditions Eighth Amendment case law, philosophy, and sociology, she suggests that “[i]n its most basic sense,
to be cruel is to inflict unjustified suffering.”330 Because imprisonment disables prisoners from safeguarding their own
welfare, she says, “the imposition of cruel prison conditions
represents not personal but institutional cruelty, which arises
when an institution by its design and operation inflicts unnecessary and avoidable harm on those subject to its effects.”331
Taking as her chief target Farmer v. Brennan, she argues that
its criminal recklessness approach is inappropriate, and offers
in its stead several proposed liability standards sounding in
negligence or strict liability.332 Paulo Barrozo argues that the
punishment is cruel—and should be deemed to violate the
Constitution—when it causes “a grave violation of human dignity . . . severe[ly] violat[ing] . . . the respect, consideration, and
care commanded by the dignity individuals embody.”333 He
develops at length the difference between this approach and an
intent-focused one. Alice Ristroph likewise argues that
Whitley, Wilson, and Farmer implement a vision of cruelty that
is unduly taken with the moral significance of intentionality.334
While “[o]ne could make consequentialist, expressivist, and
character-based arguments in support of the claims that
prison officials’ intentions are relevant to constitutional analysis,” she writes, those arguments are far from compelling.335
Moreover, “federal decisions involving prisoners’ claims of cruel
and unusual punishment do seem to establish that official intentions are a device to evade responsibility,” normatively pernicious in light of “the state’s responsibility for the safety and
well-being of individual human beings . . . when the state forcibly confines them.”336
In short, the words “cruel and unusual” do not support a
subjective focus. What, then, are the parameters of the Eighth
329

Dolovich, supra note 44, at 883 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 884.
331
Id. at 893 (emphasis omitted).
332
See id. at 883–84, 893, 895–972.
333
Paulo D. Barrozo, Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, 6 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 175, 242 (2014).
334
See Ristroph, supra note 155, at 1401.
335
Id. at 1403.
336
Id. at 1403–04; see David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing and the State, 13
LEGAL THEORY 1, 13–14 (2007).
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Amendment’s constraints on use of force and conditions of
confinement? Like Justice Stevens, I begin with the premise
that because post-conviction “imprisonment [is] a punishment
for crime,”337 all its conditions count as punishment. Similarly, as the Court phrased the point in Ingraham v. Wright,
“[p]rison brutality . . . is ‘part of the total punishment to which
the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a
proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.’”338 The question is how to determine when force or conditions are and are
not constitutional. Although I think the bottom line—objective
reasonableness—is the same for use of force and conditions of
confinement, the analysis is different, so I take them in turn.
I will start with use of force. The constitutional hooks for
regulation of the jail and prison officials who supervise pretrial
detainees and convicts may vary, but, with respect to use of
force, the moral and practical imperatives do not. Morally and
practically, force in jail and force in prison are both appropriate
only when reasonably necessary to maintain order and safety.
Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Sotomayor emphasized this
point with respect to use of force, during the Kingsley oral
argument. Justice Kennedy began: “I just have to tell you, I
find it very difficult to understand how it would be a different
standard if these same facts occurred, but it was an inmate
who was serving a sentence. What—what is the rationale for
why they should be different?”339 And Justice Sotomayor similarly asked, “Why are we giving a license to prison guards to
use unreasonable or unnecessary force . . . against anybody?”340 Kingsley’s counsel responded, “Convicted prisoners
actually can be punished. That is one of the legitimate objectives with respect to convicted prisoners.”341 To which Justice
Sotomayor responded, “But they can’t be punished corporally. . . . Do you think . . . you can knock them against the wall
as punishment?”342 Sotomayor later stated, “Whether it’s a
pretrial detainee or post-trial detainee, I don’t think the Constitution gives you a free pass to punish a prisoner by inflicting
unwanted corporal punishment.”343
337

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915
(5th Cir. 1976)).
339
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015) (No. 14-6368), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/14-6368_linq.pdf [https://perma.cc/57CZ-HDN4].
340
Id. at 12.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id. at 20.
338
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Justice Sotomayor was exactly right. With the exception of
the death penalty, corporal punishment for crime is categorically forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. While the Supreme
Court has not—quite—baldly stated the point, this was the
effective bottom line344 of the Eighth Circuit case Jackson v.
Bishop, in which then-Judge Blackmun enjoined the use of
disciplinary flogging in the Arkansas prison system345 in an
opinion that has been repeatedly cited with approval by the
Supreme Court.346 If some corporal punishment of prisoners
were allowed, there might be some textual justification to use
the malicious-and-sadistic (or deliberate indifference) standard
to distinguish permissible from impermissible force/punishment under the Eighth Amendment. But since neither pretrial
detainees nor post-conviction prisoners can lawfully be subjected to any corporal punishment, such a distinction makes
no sense. Instead, the same doctrinal and normative considerations that influenced the outcome in Kingsley should apply
under the Eighth Amendment as well. The only defensible liability standard for official deliberate use of force against a prisoner is the standard of objective unreasonableness.
Shifting to conditions of confinement, there is a need to
distinguish permissibly from impermissibly harsh prison conditions.347 Some might even think it is appropriate for conditions to be harsher for convicted prisoners than for pretrial
detainees. I do not, personally, agree; in my ideal criminal
justice system, the loss of liberty inherent in incarceration, not
harsh conditions on the inside, would be the punitive aspect of
post-conviction imprisonment. And in actual practice, the differences run in the opposite direction: jails tend to be harsher,
344
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287–88 (1972) (“Since the discontinuance of flogging as a constitutionally permissible punishment, death remains as
the only punishment that may involve the conscious infliction of physical pain.”
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968))); id. at 430 (“Neither the Congress nor any state legislature would today
tolerate pillorying, branding, or cropping or nailing of the ears—punishments that
were in existence during our colonial era. Should, however, any such punishment
be prescribed, the courts would certainly enjoin its execution.” (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968))).
345
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 581 (8th Cir. 1968).
346
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
347
Cf. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (“But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel
and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”).
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more idle, and more dangerous than prisons.348 But in any
event, even if post-conviction conditions are permissibly harsher than pretrial conditions, and granted that there is a need
to separate appropriate from inappropriate conditions, that
need is simply no justification for using a particular officer or
official’s state of mind to mark the separation. Intentionality,
as I have already argued, is not required by the Eighth Amendment’s text, whether the relevant words are “cruel and unusual” or “punishment.” And Wilson’s intent requirement
suffers from the practical and normative flaws already
identified.
Bell/Kingsley’s alternative approach of testing conditions
to ensure they are “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective”349—that is, to ensure that they are objectively reasonable—is both more direct, and lacks these
untoward effects. Wilson should be overruled and Eighth
Amendment aligned with Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.
Harsh post-conviction conditions that risk “serious deprivations of basic human needs”350 while serving no legitimate
function constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
CONCLUSION
In a forthcoming article, Aziz Huq and Genevieve Lakier
trace what they label the “triumph of fault in public law.”351
They argue persuasively that the trend since the 1970s in constitutional doctrine has been to unduly emphasize individual
culpability as a prerequisite for liability. Huq and Lakier’s article barely touches jail and prison litigation, but the developments it identifies are consonant with the notable but
contested shifts towards a fault-based system described in Part
I. The modern constitutional law of incarceration, as I showed
there, did not consistently focus on the culpability of individual
348
See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 11, at 1686–87 & sources
cited (“[J]ails are more dangerous than prisons, in large part because of the
primary operational difference between the two types of facilities: prisons take and
hold inmates while jails take and release them. This extremely fast turnover
makes jails inherently more chaotic. More generally comparing jails to prisons,
classification of jail inmates is more haphazard, jail routines are less regular, jail
time is more idle, and jail inmates are more likely to be in some kind of crisis. Jail
inmates are also more likely to be vulnerable to harm in many ways—mentally ill,
inexperienced with incarceration, drunk or high, or suicidal.” (footnotes omitted)).
349
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
350
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
351
Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The Triumph of Fault in Public Law, 131
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940016 [https://perma.cc/CM2H-NH6V].
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governmental defendants until 1986, in Whitley v. Albers, and
1991, in Wilson v. Seiter. And ever since the Supreme Court
began examining how the Constitution regulates force and conditions in jails and prisons, there have been Justices arguing—
in majorities, prior to 1986, and in dissents since—that constitutional liability should not turn on a particular official’s state
of mind.352 As Justice Blackmun summarized the position:
A punishment is simply no less cruel or unusual because its
harm is unintended. . . . [Pre-Wilson Supreme Court cases,]
which employed an objective standard to chart the boundaries of the Eighth Amendment, reflected the practical reality
that “intent simply is not very meaningful when considering a
challenge to an institution, such as a prison system.” [Their
approach] also, however, demonstrated a commitment to the
principles underlying the Eighth Amendment. The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause was not adopted to protect
prison officials with arguably benign intentions from lawsuits. The Eighth Amendment guarantees each prisoner that
reasonable measures will be taken to ensure his safety.
Where a prisoner can prove that no such reasonable steps
were taken and, as a result, he experienced severe pain or
suffering without any penological justification, the Eighth
Amendment is violated regardless of whether there is an easily identifiable wrongdoer with poor intentions.353

And as Justice White explained in Wilson: “The ultimate result
of today’s decision, I fear, is that ‘serious deprivations of basic
human needs,’ will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and
meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”354
Kingsley’s embrace of an objective standard brings constitutional doctrine at least a few steps back towards the 1970s
non-fault approach, adopting the Blackmun and White positions just quoted for pretrial detainees in excessive-force cases.
352
These were the consistent views of Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall,
Brennan, and White. See supra note 74; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108–17
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bell, 441 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352, 368 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336, 341
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 306 (1991) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 851, 858 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (Stevens, J., concurring).
353
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 856–57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
354
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN203.txt

unknown

Seq: 79

19-JAN-18

2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INCARCERATION

13:41

435

The results seem to me entirely salutary. (I note for anyone
concerned about unfair monetary assessments against innocent officials that qualified immunity doctrine355 and universal
indemnification of such officials by their employing agencies356
render this prospect extremely implausible.) For the reasons
discussed in subpart III.C, district courts and courts of appeals
can and should follow Kingsley’s lead as to pretrial detention
conditions, as well.
For convicted prisoners, the path forward is steeper. Unfortunately, even though the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment case law rests on “increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations,”357 district courts and courts of appeals cannot
easily avoid it. The Court has claimed for itself “alone”358 “the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions” whenever “a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,” even if that
precedent “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions.”359 District courts and courts of appeals can
and should, however, acknowledge the conflict between Kingsley and Whitley/Wilson/Farmer, and can decline to unnecessarily extend the logic of existing Supreme Court precedent. And
litigants can and should preserve for appeal the argument that
Kingsley’s logic requires an objective standard in the Eighth as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment context and should work to
bring an appropriate case to the Supreme Court so it can exercise its prerogative. For both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners, the Constitution should guarantee that deliberate
force and intentionally created conditions do not deliver “serious deprivation[s] of basic human needs”360 without justification. Unreasonable force and unreasonable conditions of
confinement undermine the dignity of American prisoners and
355
See, e.g., Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow Cty., 298 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that qualified immunity protects those who execute an unlawful
search warrant, unless “the defects are such that they would have been noticed by
a reasonably careful officer who read the warrant before executing it”), aff’d sub
nom. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
356
See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 11, at 1676 (“[I]n nearly all
inmate litigation, it is the correctional agency that pays both litigation costs and
any judgments or settlements, even though individual officers are the nominal
defendants.”); Schwartz, supra note , at 885 (explaining that 99.98% of money
recovered in lawsuits against law enforcement agencies is paid by the agency, not
by the individual defendants).
357
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co.,
93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.)).
358
Id.
359
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989).
360
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
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of the American criminal justice system. The Supreme Court
should revisit Whitley, Wilson, and Farmer, returning to the
approach the Court took in Hutto and other cases in the 1970s,
to simultaneously serve justice and improve doctrinal
coherence.

